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[Doh] DOH bypassing protection mechanisms

"Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Sun, 05 November 2017 15:48 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
To: doh@ietf.org
Date: Sun, 05 Nov 2017 07:48:21 -0800
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Subject: [Doh] DOH bypassing protection mechanisms
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On 5 Nov 2017, at 0:30, Eliot Lear wrote:

>   * Use of DoH will bypass protection mechanisms commonly used to
>     efficiently detect and prevent access to known malware-infested
>     sites.  There are two mitigation mechanisms available, but one is
>     incomplete:  deployments make use of in-path blocking methods such
>     as IP access lists.  This is partial because there is a
>     performance/memory impact in doing so, and the query itself can
>     indicate that the device itself is infected.  The other mitigation
>     here is to have a configuration mechanism to turn on/off DoH in
>     order to use the existing infrastructure.  This has the least impact
>     on surrounding infrastructure (and takes the least text ;-).

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