Re: [Doh] Privacy Considerations Text (#2)

Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> Tue, 26 June 2018 02:01 UTC

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From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
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Subject: Re: [Doh] Privacy Considerations Text (#2)
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On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 07:40:20PM -0400, Patrick McManus wrote:
> What if, instead, we add a new first paragraph to the "In the server" section
> along the lines of
> 
> "The original DNS wireformat contains no client identifiers, however various
> transports of the DNS wireformat do provide data that can be used for request
> correlation. HTTPS presents new considerations for correlation ranging from
> explicit HTTP cookies to implicit fingerprinting of the unique set and ordering
> of request headers."


I think this is good (sorry for my recent silence, but I've been
watching this discussion avidly & thank the editors for their good
work).  I particularly agree that it is fair to note that lots of
servers have been doing various kinds of request correlation for a
long time.

> Implementations of DoH clients and servers need to consider the
> benefit and privacy impact of these features, and their deployment
> context, when deciding whether or not to enable them. Implementations
> are advised to expose the minimal set of data needed to achieve the desired
> feature set.

I think this is good, too -- it's neutral while yet raising the right
degree of alarm.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com