Re: [Dots] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-dots-requirements-16

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Sun, 25 November 2018 20:33 UTC

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Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 14:33:34 -0600
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Scott Bradner <sob@sobco.com>
Cc: ops-dir@ietf.org, draft-ietf-dots-requirements.all@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org, dots@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Dots] Opsdir last call review of draft-ietf-dots-requirements-16
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Hi Scott,

On Sat, Nov 24, 2018 at 12:32:55PM -0800, Scott Bradner wrote:
> Reviewer: Scott Bradner
> Review result: Has Nits
> 
> This is an OPS-DIR review of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat
> Signaling Requirements (draft-ietf-dots-requirements)
> 
> This document lists requirements for a protocol to used between providers of
> DDOS mitigation services and users of such services, as such there can be no
> direct operational issues with the document.  I also did not find any indirect
> operational issues.
> 
> I think the document would benefit from the addition of a section before the
> requirements section that specifically describes the setup assumed by the
> document. The descriptions before there hint at a presumed setup but a new
> section that clearly states the setup would be helpful. (the setup appears to
> be one where all network traffic to and from a protected entity flows through a
> DDoS mitigation service provider.  The provider includes one or more DOTS
> servers.  The protected entity includes one or more DOTS clients that
> communicate with the DOTS servers)

Just to double-check: you think that the reference to
draft-ietf-dots-architecture is insufficient in this regard?

Thanks,

Ben

> Requirement SIG-005 addresses channel redirection – maybe there needs to be a
> way that clients can move to a new server on their own if they lose hearbeat
> from the server they were using – that might include a way for a server to
> provide a list of alternative servers to the clients
> 
>