Re: [Dots] DOTS: TLS 1.2 & TLS1.3

[Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>]

On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 01:39:12PM +0000, [e-mail] wrote:
> Hi Benjamin,
> 
> Now that RFC8446 is out and given that it obsoletes RFC5246, we need your advice on how to proceed to (hopefully) avoid breaking existing implementations while still encouraging for TLS 1.3. FWIW, the current situation is as follows:
> 
> *         Existing DOTS implementations relies on TLS 1.2.
> 
> *         The signal channel draft mandates TLS 1.2 or later.
> 
> *         The signal channel draft specifies a profile for (D)TLS 1.3. (DTLS 1.3 is still a draft)

All these are fine.

> 
> Would it be OK if we maintain the current wording in the draft as it with some minor changes? (that is, only update TLS1.3 ID to RFC8446, remove reference to RFC5077, maintain RFC5246)

idnits (and thus the genart and probably other reviewers) will complain
about references to an obsoleted document, so I would try to minimize the
references to 5246 to just those that are actually specific to 1.2.  (For
example, when talking about fatal alerts, use Section 6 of 8446 instead of
Section 7.2 of 5246.)  But it doesn't look like there are a great deal of
such instances, so maybe it would still qualify ias "minor changes"?
There's certainly going to be no opposition to continuing to allow the use
of TLS 1.2 -- changing that would be too great a disruption to ongoing work
to be advisable.

Does that help?

-Ben