Re: [Dots] DOTS: TLS 1.2 & TLS1.3

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dots <dots-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Benjamin Kaduk
> Sent: Friday, August 17, 2018 3:33 AM
> To: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
> Cc: dots@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Dots] DOTS: TLS 1.2 & TLS1.3
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 01:39:12PM +0000, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
> wrote:
> > Hi Benjamin,
> >
> > Now that RFC8446 is out and given that it obsoletes RFC5246, we need your
> advice on how to proceed to (hopefully) avoid breaking existing
> implementations while still encouraging for TLS 1.3. FWIW, the current
> situation is as follows:
> >
> > *         Existing DOTS implementations relies on TLS 1.2.
> >
> > *         The signal channel draft mandates TLS 1.2 or later.
> >
> > *         The signal channel draft specifies a profile for (D)TLS 1.3. (DTLS 1.3 is
> still a draft)
> 
> All these are fine.
> 
> >
> > Would it be OK if we maintain the current wording in the draft as it
> > with some minor changes? (that is, only update TLS1.3 ID to RFC8446,
> > remove reference to RFC5077, maintain RFC5246)
> 
> idnits (and thus the genart and probably other reviewers) will complain about
> references to an obsoleted document, so I would try to minimize the references
> to 5246 to just those that are actually specific to 1.2.  (For example, when
> talking about fatal alerts, use Section 6 of 8446 instead of Section 7.2 of 5246.)
> But it doesn't look like there are a great deal of such instances, so maybe it
> would still qualify ias "minor changes"?
> There's certainly going to be no opposition to continuing to allow the use of TLS
> 1.2 -- changing that would be too great a disruption to ongoing work to be
> advisable.
> 
> Does that help?

Yes, we will minimize the references to RFC5246 and retain the wording to mandate the use of (D)TLS 1.2 or later.

Cheers,
-Tiru

> 
> -Ben
> 
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