Re: [Dots] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18.txt

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Tue, 28 December 2021 15:52 UTC

Return-Path: <kaduk@mit.edu>
X-Original-To: dots@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dots@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C370E3A1718 for <dots@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 28 Dec 2021 07:52:14 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.496
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.496 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, KHOP_HELO_FCRDNS=0.399, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id d2rhzA3kweVp for <dots@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 28 Dec 2021 07:52:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 72CF33A1717 for <dots@ietf.org>; Tue, 28 Dec 2021 07:52:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mit.edu ([24.16.140.251]) (authenticated bits=56) (User authenticated as kaduk@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id 1BSFq3xL023499 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 28 Dec 2021 10:52:08 -0500
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 07:52:03 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Cc: "dots@ietf.org" <dots@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <20211228155203.GV11486@mit.edu>
References: <163939252488.21261.15352577366570117756@ietfa.amsl.com> <23629_1639392661_61B72595_23629_108_1_787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B9330354635AD@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <23629_1639392661_61B72595_23629_108_1_787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B9330354635AD@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dots/aja_OhW5geTlO2ms5VhkZJHvOCw>
Subject: Re: [Dots] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18.txt
X-BeenThere: dots@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "List for discussion of DDoS Open Threat Signaling \(DOTS\) technology and directions." <dots.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dots>, <mailto:dots-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dots/>
List-Post: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dots-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dots>, <mailto:dots-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 15:52:15 -0000

On Mon, Dec 13, 2021 at 10:51:00AM +0000, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
> Hi Ben, all,
> 
> This version integrates the AD review.
> 
> Please let us know if there are issues we didn't address. Thank you. 

Thanks, and sorry for not tending to my email more quickly.

You probably already saw the handful of replies I sent to the email thread
(and https://github.com/boucadair/draft-dots-telemetry/pull/10).

I do not think I saw a reply to this remark on Section 8.1:

===
   In order to signal telemetry data in a mitigation efficacy update, it
   is RECOMMENDED that the DOTS client has already established a DOTS
   telemetry setup session with the server in 'idle' time.

If I understand correctly, it seems that at least part of the need for
having a preestablished telemetry session is that the mitigation
efficacy update is identified only by the 'mid', and so we cannot
specify a 'tmid' as part of such an efficacy update.  Thus, in order
for the server to associate the telemetry data in the efficacy update
with an ongoing telemetry status session, the 'tsid' must be associated
with the 'mid' that is the subject of the efficacy update.
If that is correct, then I think we should have some text here about how
the efficacy update does not/cannot include the 'tmid', and so is
associated with the 'mid' of the update.
===

Of the things in the email chain, I am most interested in getting clarity
around:

- what to put in the "attack-id" field when we are sending an
  "attack-description" string for a not-previously-characterized attack (or
  make that field not mandatory at the YANG level).

- when a server updates its published attack mappings, if there's a
  requirement/expectation that already assigned attack-id values retain the
  same meaning.

Thanks again,

Ben