Re: [Dots] Target-Attack-type expansion: more discussion

Töma Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com> Mon, 01 April 2019 17:13 UTC

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Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 19:13:01 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Dots] Target-Attack-type expansion: more discussion
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Peace,

On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 12:15 PM 陈美玲 <chenmeiling@chinamobile.com>; wrote:
> I'd like to continue discussion of these topics in the mail

For clarification, the quotations below that line are from the draft
[1], not from the mailing list thread.


> Therefore, it is necessary to unify the attack definition,
> form a standard attack definition

I do not anticipate that happening in the foreseeable future. Mainly,
because of the differences between traffic classifying and filtering
engines. Also, because the state of scientific research on the problem
space is quite poor.

> we give out a complete format for DDoS attacks as below

>From the text and also from the slides [2] it is not clear what
exactly you list under "protocol level".
It appears like something very close to the OSI layering, however,

a) in this case the proper word would be "layer", not "level",
b) the attribution seems quite arbitrary.

E.g. ICMP flood is coupled with "Network_Layer" while it could also
affect the data link layer if e.g. there's no "no arp packet-priority
enable" on an interface in a Cisco switched network.
The same with memcached reflection which could cause an effect on the
layer 2 through 4 performance of a network (and I'd even go as far as
to say that L4 being affected is the least likely case).

***

All in all, as I tried to point out during the session, I've
personally seen a similar problem of conversion between different item
classification methods being solved before in 3GPP world, where e.g.
HP OpenView and Huawei M2000/J2000 had almost entirely different
concepts of event type, status, and severity, yet communicated just
fine through software-defined mapping tables provided by the
respective vendors. Sometimes, it's best to follow that path, and a
good thing is: you don't need a years-long IETF process for that to go
live.

References:
[1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-meiling-dots-attack-type-expansion-00
[2]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/104/materials/slides-104-dots-attack-bandwidth-and-attack-type-expansion-01

--
Töma