Re: [drinks] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-drinks-spp-protocol-over-soap-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> Thu, 19 March 2015 16:21 UTC

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Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 12:21:32 -0400
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, draft-ietf-drinks-spp-protocol-over-soap.all@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [drinks] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-drinks-spp-protocol-over-soap-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Authors: Any response to Stephen on this?

For my part: Stephen, are you seeing some risk associated with a MUST for
Digest?  It doesn't preclude implementations from *also* using TLS client
authentication, and it seems to agree with the general direction of having
a required minimum level of security.

--Richard



On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 9:33 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-drinks-spp-protocol-over-soap-07: Discuss
>
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> Please refer to http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
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>
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-drinks-spp-protocol-over-soap/
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
> I just want to check one thing...
>
> Section 5: why is there a MUST for Digest auth?  What'd be
> wrong with TLS client auth here?  I do wish the WG had
> considered some alternative to passwords, which don't make so
> much sense in this use-case.  (BTW: You could chose HOBA here
> I guess, but that's still in the RFC editor queue and not
> supported by libraries so perhaps doesn't suit. But it'd work.
> I'm an author of the HOBA spec though, so I'm biased:-) Anyway
> - can you tell me if the WG considered dropping passwords
> entirely and mandating TLS client auth be implemented?  If the
> WG seriously considered TLS client auth already, I'll just
> clear.
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
> - General: why would one want to ever run this protocol
> without TLS? Did the WG consider saying that TLS MUST be used?
> Again, if you tell me you thought about it, I'll just clear.
>
> - 7.1.2: The framework uses "Identifier" but here you use
> "Identity" - it'd be better to be consistent I think and
> "Identifier" is a lot better.
>
> - section 11 is weaker than the corresponding section in the
> framework draft. Two things: 1) why not point back to the
> framework here? 2) shouldn't you say which of the
> vulns/mitigations called out in the framework are relevant or
> mitigated here?
>
>
>