Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] What has gone wrong with RNGs in practice

Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com> Mon, 17 March 2014 14:35 UTC

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From: Dan Brown <dbrown@certicom.com>
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Thread-Topic: Re: What has gone wrong with RNGs in practice
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Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2014 14:35:00 +0000
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Subject: Re: [dsfjdssdfsd] What has gone wrong with RNGs in practice
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> EE. Bad entropy estimation

> 

> Numerous RNGs rely on each entropy inputs being acccompanied by an

> estimate of how many bits of entropy each contains. Historically,

> these entropy estimates have been pretty bogus, but I'm not aware of

> any attack arising out of that.

 

Does the Goldberg-Wagner attack on the poorly seeded Netscape SSL RNG count
here?

 

 


Daniel Brown


Research In Motion Limited