Re: [Emu] Issue 47 Certificate identity checks

Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> Mon, 12 April 2021 16:25 UTC

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From: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 09:25:27 -0700
Message-ID: <CAOgPGoBWdKAADbLSJRzaUzsD=0hyKvSNpyk7d9ZZXSHiQTSM4w@mail.gmail.com>
To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
Cc: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>, EMU WG <emu@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Issue 47 Certificate identity checks
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On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 6:02 AM Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> wrote:

> Hi Alan,
>
> On 12 Apr 2021, at 14:52, Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> wrote:
>
>
> EAP TLS peer implementations MUST allow for configuration of a unique
> trust root to validate the server's certificate.
>
>
> This statement seems independent of the previous one, and may be overly
> broad.  Let me give you an example: a device may be designed only to
> operate as part of a federation.
>
>
>  I would agure there that the federation should have it's own CA.
>
>
> That’s what I’m thinking.  But I could imagine hardcoded devices that make
> use of it.  That’s all.
>
>
[Joe] Relying on a burned in certificate this way seems like a really bad
idea.  What happens when that certificate expires?


> Eliot
>