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Re: [Emu] Issue 47 Certificate identity checks

Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> Mon, 12 April 2021 13:09 UTC

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From: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>
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Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 09:09:31 -0400
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To: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Issue 47 Certificate identity checks
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On Apr 11, 2021, at 11:19 PM, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> wrote:
> 2. CAs MAY issue certs to EAP Servers that specify the id-kp-eapOverLAN EKU specified in RFC 3770.  EAP TLS peer implementations SHOULD allow for the configuration to require the id-kp-eapOverLAN EKU for validation of EAP server certificates.  

  Just one final note on id-kp-eapOverLAN.

  RFC 3770 describes that as being used for client certs.  If we allow it for server certs, then how can we tell them apart?

  i.e. a client could take it's cert, set itself up as a WiFi hotspot, and no *other* client could tell the difference between the "fake" server cert, and a real one.

  As a result, it looks like id-kp-eapOverLAN is not appropriate for server certs.

  Alan DeKok.

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