Re: [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-httpbis-cdn-loop-01

["Joel M. Halpern" <[e-mail]>]

Thanks for the rewrite on the first one.

I can live without adding the comment on the second.  I think the 
security folks will wonder and have to reproduce the reasoning as to why 
it is a non-issue.  (But if you add that disclaimer, they will probably 
just come up with another one.)

Yours,
Joel

On 12/17/18 10:26 PM, Mark Nottingham wrote:
> 
> 
>> On 18 Dec 2018, at 1:16 pm, Joel M. Halpern <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Thank you Mark.
>> On the first item, please look carefully at the use of pronouns.  It took me several readings to realize which CDNS "they" referred to.
> 
> I've rewritten to:
> 
> """
> Note that a CDN that allows customers to remove or modify the CDN-Loop header field (i.e., they do not implement this specification) remains an attack vector against both implementing and non-implementing CDNs.
> """
> 
>> On the second item, it was not TLS protection I was referring to. Rather, I was imagining one bad cache stripping the loop prevention.  I think the real answer to that is that it is no worse than such a cache originating bad requests.
> 
> s/cache/intermediary/, but yes -- there isn't any (or at least significant) amplification.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> 
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>> On 12/17/18 6:53 PM, Mark Nottingham wrote:
>>> Hi Joel,
>>> Thanks for the review.
>>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 5:45 am, Joel Halpern <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> ...
>>>>     This depends upon CDNs which have not been upgraded not stripping this
>>>>     header.  While I can believe that is a reasonable assumption, it seems that
>>>>     a paragraph explaining that it is the case, and if possible what experience
>>>>     leads us to think it is the case, would be helpful.
>>> I've added:
>>> """
>>> Note that if a CDN that does not implement this specification allows customers to remove or modify the CDN-Loop header field, that CDN could become an attack vector against other CDNs, even if they do implement it.
>>> """
>>>>     This document says that it is to protect against attackers causing loops.
>>>>     If the attacker is an external customer, the advice in the security
>>>>     considerations section makes sense.  The other apparent attack would be an
>>>>     attacker in the network who strips the information each time it comes past.
>>>>      I believe the reason this is only an apparent attack is that such an
>>>>     attacker could almost as easily simply generate additional messages instead
>>>>     of producing a loop.  If I have inferred this correctly, it seems useful to
>>>>     state it.
>>> CDN back-end connections are increasingly protected by HTTPS. Also, most back-end connections are over transit that's unlikely to meddle in these ways (unless a state actor is involved).
>>> Even so, the spec already says:
>>> """
>>> The threat model that the CDN-Loop header field addresses is a customer who is attempting to attack
>>> a service provider by configuring a forwarding loop by accident or malice.
>>> """
>>> .... which seems to address your concern. I'm wary of enumerating the attacks which this header doesn't prevent, since it's a necessarily open list. Inserting requirements like "back-end connections SHOULD be over HTTPS" are more appropriate for a general spec defining what a CDN is (and we're not there yet; this spec is a baby step towards that :).
>>> Cheers,
>>> --
>>> Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/
> 
> --
> Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/
>