Re: [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-httpbis-cdn-loop-01

[Mark Nottingham <[e-mail]>]

> On 18 Dec 2018, at 1:16 pm, Joel M. Halpern <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Thank you Mark.
> On the first item, please look carefully at the use of pronouns.  It took me several readings to realize which CDNS "they" referred to.

I've rewritten to:

"""
Note that a CDN that allows customers to remove or modify the CDN-Loop header field (i.e., they do not implement this specification) remains an attack vector against both implementing and non-implementing CDNs.
"""

> On the second item, it was not TLS protection I was referring to. Rather, I was imagining one bad cache stripping the loop prevention.  I think the real answer to that is that it is no worse than such a cache originating bad requests.

s/cache/intermediary/, but yes -- there isn't any (or at least significant) amplification.

Cheers,


> 
> Yours,
> Joel
> 
> On 12/17/18 6:53 PM, Mark Nottingham wrote:
>> Hi Joel,
>> Thanks for the review.
>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 5:45 am, Joel Halpern <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> ...
>>>    This depends upon CDNs which have not been upgraded not stripping this
>>>    header.  While I can believe that is a reasonable assumption, it seems that
>>>    a paragraph explaining that it is the case, and if possible what experience
>>>    leads us to think it is the case, would be helpful.
>> I've added:
>> """
>> Note that if a CDN that does not implement this specification allows customers to remove or modify the CDN-Loop header field, that CDN could become an attack vector against other CDNs, even if they do implement it.
>> """
>>>    This document says that it is to protect against attackers causing loops.
>>>    If the attacker is an external customer, the advice in the security
>>>    considerations section makes sense.  The other apparent attack would be an
>>>    attacker in the network who strips the information each time it comes past.
>>>     I believe the reason this is only an apparent attack is that such an
>>>    attacker could almost as easily simply generate additional messages instead
>>>    of producing a loop.  If I have inferred this correctly, it seems useful to
>>>    state it.
>> CDN back-end connections are increasingly protected by HTTPS. Also, most back-end connections are over transit that's unlikely to meddle in these ways (unless a state actor is involved).
>> Even so, the spec already says:
>> """
>> The threat model that the CDN-Loop header field addresses is a customer who is attempting to attack
>> a service provider by configuring a forwarding loop by accident or malice.
>> """
>> .... which seems to address your concern. I'm wary of enumerating the attacks which this header doesn't prevent, since it's a necessarily open list. Inserting requirements like "back-end connections SHOULD be over HTTPS" are more appropriate for a general spec defining what a CDN is (and we're not there yet; this spec is a baby step towards that :).
>> Cheers,
>> --
>> Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/

--
Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/