Re: [Gen-art] [certid] Gen-ART LC Review of draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-11

Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im> Tue, 07 December 2010 19:54 UTC

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Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2010 12:56:09 -0700
From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Cc: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, IETF cert-based identity <certid@ietf.org>, =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>, draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] [certid] Gen-ART LC Review of draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-11
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On 12/7/10 8:01 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> [[ Much abbreviated ]]
> 
> At 9:10 PM -0700 12/6/10, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>>>>> -- 3.1, rule 6:
>>>>>
>>>>> Can you motivate why this is not a MUST NOT?
>>> The reason for allowing this wiggle-room is that (for better or worse)..
>>>
>>>   1. the CA/Browser Forum Extended Validation (EV) Certificate Guidelines
>>>      explicitly allow for multiple CN-IDs
>>>
>>>   2. It's a not-totally-uncommon current practice to have certs that do
>>> have
>>>      mutiple CN-IDs, eg from Comodo (whether EV or DV (domain valivdated)).
>>>
>>>   3. Virtual hosting multiple distinct-domain TLS servers on one entity is
>>>      difficult today if one desires wide desktop client support because
>>>      a certain vendor's older-but-still-widely-deployed-OS does not (yet?)
>>>      support the TLS Server Name Indication extension. Thus having one
>>>      cert with all the domains jammed in it (as either/both CN-IDs or/and
>>>      DNS-IDs) is a workaround (eg Content Delivery Networks use this).
>>>
>>>
>>> So some argue that if we MUST NOT multiple CN-IDs at this point, it is
>>> flying in the face of present reality and might contribute to acquiring
>>> an attained reputation for this BCP that is lower than we desire.
>>>
>>> There is also concern on the part of CA folk about client-side TLS libs
>>> and their support for name matching (ie some (old?) one(s) will only
>>> match on CN-ID).
>>>
>>> For a CA perspective on all the above, see...
>>>
>>> Re: [certid] weird CN-IDs (subjectCommonName) in SSL Labs Survey Data
>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/certid/current/msg00502.html
>>
>> +1 to all that.
> 
> Putting an explanation such as the above in the document will help future IETFs to decide when to make this a MUST NOT. It might also help the CA/Browser Forum and specific CAs see that they should stop doing this ASAP, and maybe even convince a particular legacy OS vendor to support TLS SNI.

Sigh. I don't particularly want to add a long informational note that
qualifies eight words in the spec, but you're right. :)

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/