Re: [GROW] [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-00.txt

[Marco Marzetti <[e-mail]>]

On Sun, Jan 15, 2017 at 3:49 PM, Job Snijders <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 15, 2017 at 03:39:37PM +0100, Marco Marzetti wrote:
>> On Sun, Jan 15, 2017 at 1:32 AM, Randy Bush <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> > [ first, i do not use route serves (because of the data/control non-
>> >   congruence), so my opinion here is worth even less than it normally
>> >   is. ]
>> >
>> >> An ixp route-server is not a transit provider, all of the nexthops
>> >> exposed are in fact peers. So no I do not consider such a  device an
>> >> "upstream" it exists to service the policy needs of the peers on the
>> >> fabric  rather than that of the exchange operator.
>> >
>> > to repeat my previous; those policy needs might vary across ix members.
>> > some may want the ix to enforce origin validation for them, some may
>> > not.  those exchanges which offer validation today offer the choice.  i
>> > think that is the right thing; let the member make the choice at set-up
>> > with the route server.
>>
>> I think RSs should do RPKI by default and allow for two behaviors:
>> 1) Drop (default)
>> 2) Add ext-community as this draft suggests (upon request)
>
> Or perhaps we consider a Route Server to be "Just Yet Another Autonomous
> System"? Why should there be a difference between Autonomous Systems
> with regard to routing security recommendations?
>

I do consider it "another AS".

> If the recommendation is to drop/ignore/reject "RPKI Invalid"
> announcements, then that applies to Route Servers too, if the
> recommendation is to just attach an Extended BGP Community, then that
> will apply to all ASNs.

What's the current recommendation now?

Regards

-- 
Marco