Re: [Hipsec] some comments for mm-03: Section 6

>> If an attacker somehow uses a bug in the implementation or  
>> weakness in
>> some protocol to redirect a HIP connection, the original owner can
>> always reclaim their connection (they can always prove ownership  
>> of the
>> private key associated with their public HI).
>
> How is this possible if the private key is compromised?

If the private key is compromised, there is nothing you can do.  The  
only think you can do is to revoke the public key; something the (so  
far) have deliberately left out of scope.

>> MitM attacks are always possible if the attacker is present during  
>> the
>> initial HIP base exchange and if the hosts do not authenticate each
>> other's identities, but once the base exchange has taken place even a
>> MitM cannot steal an opportunistic HIP connection because it is very
>> difficult for an attacker to create an UPDATE packet (or any HIP  
>> packet)
>> that will be accepted as a legitimate update.
>
> This does not make sense because it is too obvious? After  
> opportunistic
> connection (leap of faith) the connection is no longer opportunistic.
> Maybe this text can be just removed.

It may be obvious to you and me, but not to everyone.

--Pekka

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