Re: [Hipsec] HIP-based anycast

Hi,

HIP anycast would need a HIT to identify the members of the anycast
group, wouldn't it?

So why not have a key pair generated for the group, and the HIT
derived from the public key be the anycast HIT. One could then use the
group anycast key pair to sign authorization certificates granting
membership into the group. Similar concept has been explored for IPv6
multicast and anycast group in:

CASTELLUCCIA, C. AND MONTENEGRO, G. 2003. Securing group management in
ipv6 with cryptographically
generated addresses. In The Eighth IEEE Symposium on Computers and
Communications
(ISCC’2003).

--julien

On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 1:38 AM, Miika Komu <mkomu@cs.hut.fi> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> opportunistic mode with the help of a rendezvous server could be used for
> implementing HIP-based anycast. The current RVS specification does not allow
> this:
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis-02
>
> 4.3.1. Processing Outgoing I1 Packets
>
>    An initiator SHOULD NOT send an opportunistic I1 with a NULL
>    destination HIT to an IP address that is known to be a rendezvous
>    server address, unless it wants to establish a HIP association with
>    the rendezvous server itself and does not know its HIT.
>
> I think we could specify either a flag in the base exchange or alternatively
> a special HIT encoding for the "NULL" destination HIT in the I1. What do you
> think?
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