Re: [HOKEY] consensus call: key delivery security protocol

Yoshihiro Ohba <yohba@tari.toshiba.com> Tue, 07 August 2007 15:18 UTC

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Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2007 11:17:37 -0400
To: Charles Clancy <clancy@cs.umd.edu>
Subject: Re: [HOKEY] consensus call: key delivery security protocol
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I was taking vacation and sorry for delayed response.

How does option #1 with hop-by-hop security satisfy
draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt-09.txt, especially "Authenticate all
parties" and "Keying material confidentiality and integrity"
requirements?

Regards,
Yoshihiro Ohba



On Mon, Jul 23, 2007 at 01:32:36PM -0400, Charles Clancy wrote:
> Related issue: #28
> 
> The current key distribution document describes protocols that require a 
> shared key between the server and third party.  According to RFC 4107, 
> we are required to specify how those keys are provisioned.  The result 
> was 3 options:
> 
> #1: convert the current protocol into one that uses hop-by-hop security 
> with channel bindings based on AAA
> 
> #2: define a protocol to provision keys, as necessary, between AAA 
> servers and any remote AAA client that needs a pairwise key for 
> end-to-end security
> 
> #3: use something like cross-realm Kerberos to provide the necessary 
> cryptographics to improve upon hop-by-hop security
> 
> An initial hum eliminated option #2.  A vote for options #1 and #3 
> yielded 23 in favor of #1 and 11 in favor of #3.  This email is to 
> confirm the consensus in the room during the meeting.
> 
> Please comment by August 2.
> 
> -- 
> t. charles clancy, ph.d.  <>  tcc@umd.edu  <>  eng.umd.edu/~tcc
> adjunct professor, electrical engineering, university of maryland
> 
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