Re: [http-state] [apps-discuss] HTTP MAC Authentication Scheme

[Adam Barth <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 2:17 PM, Nico Williams <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 1:30 PM, Adam Barth <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 10:35 AM, Nico Williams <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> I'm completely on-board with session state[*].  My comments were
>>> particularly in regards to threat models.  I believe that
>>> eavesdroppers and active attackers both need to be considered,
>>> particularly as we have so many open wifi networks.
>>
>> Sorry.  We can't address active attackers using this mechanism.  If
>> you need protection from active attackers, please use TLS.
>
> I've already said as much now several times.  However, I want channel
> binding to TLS too.

I'm not sure that's appropriate for this mechanism.  What problem does
channel binding solve?

Adam


>>> To me the simplest way to address the Internet threat model is to
>>> always use TLS (except, maybe, for images and such elements that have
>>> little or no security value, though one must be careful when making
>>> that determination) and to use channel binding.  See the I-D
>>> referenced below.
>>
>> Indeed.  This mechanism is for folks who cannot or will not deploy TLS.
>
> It has value outside TLS as well.  Particularly if you're using an
> authentication mechanism that can provide mutual authentication (which
> OAuth doesn't do today, but I hear there's work in progress to add
> mutual auth to it).  And then you realize that you might want to do
> something similar with other non-OAuth authentication methods, thus
> the urge to generalize.
>
> Nico
> --
>