Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS client certificates?

["Roy T. Fielding" <[e-mail]>]

On Mar 29, 2015, at 2:12 PM, Jann Horn wrote:

> Hello,
> I've looked through draft-ietf-httpbis-alt-svc-04 and didn't see anything that
> explicitly forbids the use of TLS client certificates. The threat scenario I
> have in mind is this:
> 
> Alice is connected to the internet through a connection on which Mallory
> performs a MITM attack. Alice has a TLS client certificate that grants her
> access to sensitive information at https://bank.com/. There are no HSTS rules
> for bank.com.
> 
> Alice browses to http://news.com, a website to which she does not need a TLS
> connection. Mallory injects the following HTML snippet into the response:
> 
>    <iframe src="http://bank.com"></iframe>
> 
> Alice's browser now requests http://bank.com. Mallory intercepts the request
> and replies with a page containing malicious JavaScript code and the HTTP
> header 'Alt-Svc: h2=":443"'.
> The malicious JavaScript code now triggers further requests that the browser
> performs to bank.com via TLS, authenticating Alice using the
> non-origin-specific TLS client certificate. The server at https://bank.com
> grants access to the client based on the TLS Client Certificate and
> returns sensitive data, but the origin on the client is still http://bank.com,
> effectively allowing the attacker to bypass the protocol part of SOP
> restrictions on XHR.

Why is the origin on the client still http://bank.com/ when it is
deliberately making requests to https://bank.com:443/ ?

The client isn't being fooled into making those requests -- it is
choosing to make use of the Alt-Svc information to go to a different
origin.  In short, the JavaScript code should be prevented at that point
because the browser needs to get new code from the same origin, just
like a redirect.

....Roy