Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS client certificates?
Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com> Mon, 30 March 2015 20:21 UTC
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Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 13:15:01 -0700
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From: Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com>
To: "Roy T. Fielding" <fielding@gbiv.com>
Cc: Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
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Subject: Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS client certificates?
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I think the point of the alt-svc field is to declare that the new transport and port are the same origin in this case. -=R On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 10:55 AM, Roy T. Fielding <fielding@gbiv.com> wrote: > On Mar 30, 2015, at 10:26 AM, Ilari Liusvaara wrote: > > > On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 10:10:20AM -0700, Roy T. Fielding wrote: > >> On Mar 29, 2015, at 2:12 PM, Jann Horn wrote: > >> > >>> Hello, > >>> I've looked through draft-ietf-httpbis-alt-svc-04 and didn't see > anything that > >>> explicitly forbids the use of TLS client certificates. The threat > scenario I > >>> have in mind is this: > >>> > >>> Alice is connected to the internet through a connection on which > Mallory > >>> performs a MITM attack. Alice has a TLS client certificate that grants > her > >>> access to sensitive information at https://bank.com/. There are no > HSTS rules > >>> for bank.com. > >>> > >>> Alice browses to http://news.com, a website to which she does not > need a TLS > >>> connection. Mallory injects the following HTML snippet into the > response: > >>> > >>> <iframe src="http://bank.com"></iframe> > >>> > >>> Alice's browser now requests http://bank.com. Mallory intercepts the > request > >>> and replies with a page containing malicious JavaScript code and the > HTTP > >>> header 'Alt-Svc: h2=":443"'. > >>> The malicious JavaScript code now triggers further requests that the > browser > >>> performs to bank.com via TLS, authenticating Alice using the > >>> non-origin-specific TLS client certificate. The server at > https://bank.com > >>> grants access to the client based on the TLS Client Certificate and > >>> returns sensitive data, but the origin on the client is still > http://bank.com, > >>> effectively allowing the attacker to bypass the protocol part of SOP > >>> restrictions on XHR. > >> > >> Why is the origin on the client still http://bank.com/ when it is > >> deliberately making requests to https://bank.com:443/ ? > > > > Because ALT-SVC does not change origin, only transport. > > Then it is broken. > > > The requests are marked: The requests have :scheme=http, instead of > > normal :scheme=https. And this is the reason for HTTP/2 requirement for > > OE: One can't reliably mark such requests for HTTP/1.X. > > The requests go to a different TCP port. It is therefore a different > authority and a different origin. > > ....Roy > > >
- HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS client … Jann Horn
- Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS cli… Patrick McManus
- Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS cli… Roy T. Fielding
- Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS cli… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS cli… Martin Thomson
- Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS cli… Roy T. Fielding
- Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS cli… Roberto Peon
- Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS cli… Roy T. Fielding
- Re: HTTP Alternative Services: What about TLS cli… Mark Nottingham