Re: CT-Policy (was: Comments on draft-stark-expect-ct-00)

=JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com> Thu, 24 November 2016 02:37 UTC

Return-Path: <ietf-http-wg-request+bounce-httpbisa-archive-bis2juki=lists.ie@listhub.w3.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EDFF1294C2 for <ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 18:37:26 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.776
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.776 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM=0.5, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-1.497, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URI_HEX=1.122] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id NxBKOfwnGMeI for <ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 18:37:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from frink.w3.org (frink.w3.org [128.30.52.56]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E1ADA1294A7 for <httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@lists.ietf.org>; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 18:37:24 -0800 (PST)
Received: from lists by frink.w3.org with local (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from <ietf-http-wg-request@listhub.w3.org>) id 1c9jr8-0007hj-SG for ietf-http-wg-dist@listhub.w3.org; Thu, 24 Nov 2016 02:33:46 +0000
Resent-Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2016 02:33:46 +0000
Resent-Message-Id: <E1c9jr8-0007hj-SG@frink.w3.org>
Received: from mimas.w3.org ([128.30.52.79]) by frink.w3.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from <Jeff.Hodges@kingsmountain.com>) id 1c9jr2-0007gY-Q7 for ietf-http-wg@listhub.w3.org; Thu, 24 Nov 2016 02:33:40 +0000
Received: from gproxy6-pub.mail.unifiedlayer.com ([67.222.39.168]) by mimas.w3.org with smtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from <Jeff.Hodges@kingsmountain.com>) id 1c9jqw-0000FA-Hy for ietf-http-wg@w3.org; Thu, 24 Nov 2016 02:33:35 +0000
Received: (qmail 5806 invoked by uid 0); 24 Nov 2016 02:33:09 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO cmgw3) (10.0.90.84) by gproxy6.mail.unifiedlayer.com with SMTP; 24 Nov 2016 02:33:09 -0000
Received: from box514.bluehost.com ([74.220.219.114]) by cmgw3 with id BeZ61u0042UhLwi01eZ9EU; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 19:33:09 -0700
X-Authority-Analysis: v=2.1 cv=K/+xQUmI c=1 sm=1 tr=0 a=9W6Fsu4pMcyimqnCr1W0/w==:117 a=9W6Fsu4pMcyimqnCr1W0/w==:17 a=L9H7d07YOLsA:10 a=9cW_t1CCXrUA:10 a=s5jvgZ67dGcA:10 a=IkcTkHD0fZMA:10 a=L24OOQBejmoA:10 a=ieNpE_y6AAAA:8 a=48vgC7mUAAAA:8 a=1XWaLZrsAAAA:8 a=dwAL_RkwAAAA:8 a=cm27Pg_UAAAA:8 a=B6KMzFptAAAA:20 a=-k4oleS8sm_uEARw-zAA:9 a=-we80YVB6pIeLezW:21 a=tZsZwV3xNqNi2ysv:21 a=QEXdDO2ut3YA:10 a=lOZzU2MLX5qQKtuoMSD9:22 a=w1C3t2QeGrPiZgrLijVG:22 a=nJcEw6yWrPvoIXZ49MH8:22 a=JxOOjAT4bmw7dgzCVrGB:22 a=xmb-EsYY8bH0VWELuYED:22
Received: from [173.224.161.129] (port=8962 helo=[10.231.90.198]) by box514.bluehost.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1.2:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:128) (Exim 4.86_1) (envelope-from <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>) id 1c9jqT-0005Ms-Sx; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 19:33:05 -0700
To: Emily Stark <estark@google.com>
Cc: IETF HTTP WG <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
From: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
Message-ID: <0514193c-a27d-4510-5c2f-caf82162bfc3@KingsMountain.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 18:33:06 -0800
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.11; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.4.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report
X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - box514.bluehost.com
X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - w3.org
X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12]
X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - KingsMountain.com
X-BWhitelist: no
X-Source-IP: 173.224.161.129
X-Exim-ID: 1c9jqT-0005Ms-Sx
X-Source:
X-Source-Args:
X-Source-Dir:
X-Source-Sender: ([10.231.90.198]) [173.224.161.129]:8962
X-Source-Auth: jeff.hodges+kingsmountain.com
X-Email-Count: 2
X-Source-Cap: a2luZ3Ntb3U7a2luZ3Ntb3U7Ym94NTE0LmJsdWVob3N0LmNvbQ==
Received-SPF: pass client-ip=67.222.39.168; envelope-from=Jeff.Hodges@kingsmountain.com; helo=gproxy6-pub.mail.unifiedlayer.com
X-W3C-Hub-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.9
X-W3C-Hub-Spam-Report: AWL=-0.624, BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM=0.5, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URI_HEX=1.122, W3C_IRA=-1, W3C_WL=-1
X-W3C-Scan-Sig: mimas.w3.org 1c9jqw-0000FA-Hy 3ae169c0731aaadc642ba9856a9bad32
X-Original-To: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
Subject: Re: CT-Policy (was: Comments on draft-stark-expect-ct-00)
Archived-At: <http://www.w3.org/mid/0514193c-a27d-4510-5c2f-caf82162bfc3@KingsMountain.com>
Resent-From: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
X-Mailing-List: <ietf-http-wg@w3.org> archive/latest/32985
X-Loop: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
Resent-Sender: ietf-http-wg-request@w3.org
Precedence: list
List-Id: <ietf-http-wg.w3.org>
List-Help: <http://www.w3.org/Mail/>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-http-wg-request@w3.org?subject=unsubscribe>

> Do you think it would be reasonable to reference the Chromium +
> Mozilla CT policies but not define a particular policy in a normative
> way?

yep :)

> I maintain that it isn't Expect-CT's place to define a CT policy just
> as it isn't HSTS's place to define what goes in a trust store,

agreed.

> but I'm totally open to having the draft discuss some of the factors
> that browsers should consider when choosing a policy.

yes, I think that'd be good, at least to illustrate what UAs' CT 
policies might entail.



> On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 4:29 PM, =JeffH
> <Jeff.Hodges@kingsmountain.com> wrote: "Expect-CT"
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-stark-expect-ct> (aka "the I-D" in
> the below) uses the term "CT policy" in many places but does not
> define the meaning of the term, as noted by EKR.
>
> On Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 1:53 PM EKR wrote:
>>
>> I'm arguing that we shouldn't define a header that says "you must
>> enforce CT" without defining what "enforce CT" means.
>
> Agreed.
>
> Emily Stark <estark@google.com> also wrote on Monday, November 21,
> 2016 at 3:28 PM:
>>
>> - Policy: One can draw an analogy to HSTS, where a site promises
>> to provide a certificate that is valid according to the client's
>> definition of valid, including factors that vary across clients
>> (variations in trust stores, SHA1 deprecation, etc.).
>
> Although I would not characterize HSTS policy in that fashion (i.e.,
> see <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797#section-5.2>), I agree there
> are (some) variations in UAs' contextual determination of whether any
> error conditions arise during secure channel establishment.
>
>> In practice, I don't think CT will be more of a foot-gun than HSTS
>> (and certainly much less than HPKP) because browsers are in close
>> collaboration to work out policies that play nicely with each
>> other.
>
> Hopefully that is the case.
>
> I note the present Chrome CT Policy is here:
>
> Certificate Transparency in Chrome
> <https://a77db9aa-a-7b23c8ea-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy/CTPolicyMay2016edition.pdf>
>
>  A first draft of the Mozilla CT Policy is here:
> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1rnqYYwscAx8WhS-MCdTiNzYQus9e37HuVyafQvEeNro>
>
>(see also: 
<https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/waQ5oqg-USg>)
>
> And discussions of CT policy overall are occurring on: "Certificate
> Transparency Policy" <ct-policy@chromium.org>
>
> The I-D should reference them in some fashion. The Moz draft has CT
> and CT background info that may be useful to borrow for the I-D or
> explicitly reference.
>
>
> Hm, it seems the term "CT qualified" (or "CT-qualified" (sigh)) -- as
> in a "CT qualified certificate" -- has traction with both GOOG and
> Moz, perhaps it ought to be employed as appropriate in the I-D.
>
>
> HTH,
>
> =JeffH