Re: CT-Policy (was: Comments on draft-stark-expect-ct-00)

=JeffH <> Thu, 24 November 2016 00:33 UTC

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To: Emily Stark <>, IETF HTTP WG <>, Eric Rescorla <>
From: =JeffH <>
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Subject: Re: CT-Policy (was: Comments on draft-stark-expect-ct-00)
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"Expect-CT" <> (aka 
"the I-D" in the below) uses the term "CT policy" in many places but 
does not define the meaning of the term, as noted by EKR.

On Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 1:53 PM EKR wrote:
 > I'm arguing that we shouldn't define a header that says "you must
 > enforce CT" without defining what "enforce CT" means.


Emily Stark <> also wrote on Monday, November 21,
2016 at 3:28 PM:
 > - Policy: One can draw an analogy to HSTS, where a site promises to
 > provide a certificate that is valid according to the client's
 > definition of valid, including factors that vary across clients
 > (variations in trust stores, SHA1 deprecation, etc.).

Although I would not characterize HSTS policy in that fashion (i.e., see
<>), I agree there are
(some) variations in UAs' contextual determination of whether any error
conditions arise during secure channel establishment.

 > In practice, I don't think CT will be more of a foot-gun than HSTS
 > (and certainly much less than HPKP) because browsers are in close
 > collaboration to work out policies that play nicely with each other.

Hopefully that is the case.

I note the present Chrome CT Policy is here:

Certificate Transparency in Chrome

A first draft of the Mozilla CT Policy is here:
(see also:!topic/ct-policy/waQ5oqg-USg)

And discussions of CT policy overall are occurring on: "Certificate 
Transparency Policy" <>

The I-D should reference them in some fashion. The Moz draft has CT and 
CT background info that may be useful to borrow for the I-D or 
explicitly reference.

Hm, it seems the term "CT qualified" (or "CT-qualified" (sigh)) -- as in 
a "CT qualified certificate" -- has traction with both GOOG and Moz, 
perhaps it ought to be employed as appropriate in the I-D.