Call for Adoption: draft-hutton-httpbis-connect-protocol-00

Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> Tue, 29 July 2014 06:41 UTC

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From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
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Subject: Call for Adoption: draft-hutton-httpbis-connect-protocol-00
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<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hutton-httpbis-connect-protocol-00>

In Toronto, we had a discussion about adopting this document as a WG document:
  <https://github.com/httpwg/wg-materials/blob/gh-pages/ietf90/minutes.md#draft-hutton-httpbis-connect-protocol>

One concern raised there was regarding the model for the extension; i.e., by effectively making support for webrtc (or any other protocol) on proxy opt-in rather than opt-out, it may cause problems as more traffic goes over proxies. However, the HTTP folks in the room didn't seem to concerned about this, since bad actors were already able to (ab)use CONNECT tunnels with impunity (effectively.

Another concern briefly mentioned was that such an extension might inhibit protocol evolution; e.g., if a firewall whitelists what tunnelled protocols it accepts, it might be that we're stuck advertising "h2" in the future. However, there didn't seem to be strong concern here, since ALPN negotiation is a separate step, and HTTP can choose to omit this header when using CONNECT for its own purposes.

With that context in place, it seemed like there was general support in the room for adopting this spec. Does anyone else have additional thoughts / concerns? 

Regards,

--
Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/