Re: Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-httpbis-alt-svc-12: (with COMMENT)

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Mon, 07 March 2016 03:33 UTC

Return-Path: <ietf-http-wg-request+bounce-httpbisa-archive-bis2juki=lists.ie@listhub.w3.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 35E051A8787 for <ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 6 Mar 2016 19:33:26 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -7.003
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.003 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=unavailable
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yb1y6SYpZcU7 for <ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 6 Mar 2016 19:33:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from frink.w3.org (frink.w3.org [128.30.52.56]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5C39A1A8784 for <httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@lists.ietf.org>; Sun, 6 Mar 2016 19:33:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from lists by frink.w3.org with local (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from <ietf-http-wg-request@listhub.w3.org>) id 1aclpk-0001mC-Bj for ietf-http-wg-dist@listhub.w3.org; Mon, 07 Mar 2016 03:27:48 +0000
Resent-Date: Mon, 07 Mar 2016 03:27:48 +0000
Resent-Message-Id: <E1aclpk-0001mC-Bj@frink.w3.org>
Received: from lisa.w3.org ([128.30.52.41]) by frink.w3.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from <martin.thomson@gmail.com>) id 1aclpe-0001lQ-Cg for ietf-http-wg@listhub.w3.org; Mon, 07 Mar 2016 03:27:42 +0000
Received: from mail-ig0-f182.google.com ([209.85.213.182]) by lisa.w3.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:RSA_ARCFOUR_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from <martin.thomson@gmail.com>) id 1aclpY-0006Gv-76 for ietf-http-wg@w3.org; Mon, 07 Mar 2016 03:27:41 +0000
Received: by mail-ig0-f182.google.com with SMTP id ig19so15070314igb.0 for <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>; Sun, 06 Mar 2016 19:27:15 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc; bh=4YiUQaJwDtP3Ynz9MiIv+gmSRx2kmxl2lCsX/sOP4w4=; b=PSVvZlLNgD4938fjtvTb9+nH7LHhybScQmZ2wBmW1Xvdo82CuWJdqf/JwlKnzZ1sgo 0XMadel48JrS2Xo2Mik8SGHBBqBZrZ3JRZnnwQIAGsPyl9vqayxURXELiP+b62tKFPSp aFWp0sCjpiSYZBRD9e4V4ODY4tsfPTWQ6X/ieZG52W0CO6qQV4GwaWzrseK0PtZzQ61+ p6hFnUNxAmdaK9Ju/DOZIjUecNKQ56Bm6vgysDAMyXOzy5TbzyhYDVbOYv1M5Cw20/BF 3xn9YEeRDonTvksGx0vCneWyriXvV96EU/pnfYGzEAq1jsd/zVKiowf1+22/mmzN6x1F MK1w==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc; bh=4YiUQaJwDtP3Ynz9MiIv+gmSRx2kmxl2lCsX/sOP4w4=; b=fYdaj3uJyEFhNtvOaefgouXBScHmT7aYk5ywgOgEuLMQmwNNPTub3XVajZw9a1zqNL HCO6Ha1WAJsGhbWg3EwQhkFMNIO+5YCy2raSzZt3wnBtwHYHRDRxU/N7KraXOE1Aa+rN AuCO8fmEkKXxS1ziCqGG/2jmdJAT/dq1CHkwElv/UvyEoBHZ5VPYl1bpEKjJtjxVrs4Y Cvhtka4OiY3SRI+JbMTCyzbfemnKCL7FQKksSwo2HPRwTOhp7xjpf3+XWBAVanxsGHjR bdLddxTf8LtNAXW2zhGPVeUEeyyad1KHiMCnoU9v4N7SVnG++mQ+ev37E/ryeoE9ujZ2 kPsg==
X-Gm-Message-State: AD7BkJKBvf97Cuonz2RZ9bL0dPIQ2fZg5oSclbCUtMaqlQonLgadXbZeEzM9zXII1KohWTWvxNsJ5pS2jnRHLQ==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.50.20.129 with SMTP id n1mr10204878ige.77.1457321230392; Sun, 06 Mar 2016 19:27:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.36.43.5 with HTTP; Sun, 6 Mar 2016 19:27:10 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <1D1A2FE2-BD88-4DC9-B3D1-9AA1061AFC6C@mnot.net>
References: <20160301122415.25221.56881.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <FAC27A79-D409-4665-A9AA-BA362B99B425@mnot.net> <56D992E5.9070406@cs.tcd.ie> <1D1A2FE2-BD88-4DC9-B3D1-9AA1061AFC6C@mnot.net>
Date: Mon, 07 Mar 2016 14:27:10 +1100
Message-ID: <CABkgnnWV+fZnJNZ0y2ub8HqWieQ_RxrFWTCDbm2Xvp=_jazJ8w@mail.gmail.com>
From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Mike Bishop <michael.bishop@microsoft.com>, HTTP WG <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Received-SPF: pass client-ip=209.85.213.182; envelope-from=martin.thomson@gmail.com; helo=mail-ig0-f182.google.com
X-W3C-Hub-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9
X-W3C-Hub-Spam-Report: AWL=1.835, BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001, W3C_AA=-1, W3C_DB=-1, W3C_IRA=-1, W3C_IRR=-3, W3C_WL=-1
X-W3C-Scan-Sig: lisa.w3.org 1aclpY-0006Gv-76 679f5281898e47514d4ef76425fbcb73
X-Original-To: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
Subject: Re: Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-httpbis-alt-svc-12: (with COMMENT)
Archived-At: <http://www.w3.org/mid/CABkgnnWV+fZnJNZ0y2ub8HqWieQ_RxrFWTCDbm2Xvp=_jazJ8w@mail.gmail.com>
Resent-From: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
X-Mailing-List: <ietf-http-wg@w3.org> archive/latest/31206
X-Loop: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
Resent-Sender: ietf-http-wg-request@w3.org
Precedence: list
List-Id: <ietf-http-wg.w3.org>
List-Help: <http://www.w3.org/Mail/>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-http-wg-request@w3.org?subject=unsubscribe>

On 7 March 2016 at 13:19, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote:
> It's just saying that clients can and use additional means to validate certificates; i.e., they're not obligated to accept a cert if it passes the 2818 checks.

In practice, browsers do pinning checks, blacklist checks, revocation
checks [1], CT signature checks, user override checks, and probably
things that I'm not aware of.  The intent was to avoid limiting
validation behaviour.  My initial reaction was that this wasn't
interoperable.  I still think we could do better, but don't want to
burden this effort unreasonably, defining what it means to validate a
certificate turns out to be hard.

[1] Hah, had you going there, we don't. Well... unless there is a
must-pin policy.