Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking
Zhong Yu <zhong.j.yu@gmail.com> Thu, 11 November 2010 19:15 UTC
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Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 13:15:53 -0600
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From: Zhong Yu <zhong.j.yu@gmail.com>
To: John Tamplin <jat@google.com>
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Cc: Hybi <hybi@ietf.org>, Bjoern Hoehrmann <derhoermi@gmx.net>
Subject: Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking
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On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 9:26 PM, John Tamplin <jat@google.com> wrote: > On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 10:20 PM, Bjoern Hoehrmann <derhoermi@gmx.net> wrote: >> Going by <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-aes128-ctr-00>, >> To encrypt a message M, the sender partitions M into B-bit blocks >> M = M[1] M[2] ... M[n-1] M[n]. Each block of M is then XOR'd with >> an encrypted counter value: ... >> >> (the draft uses non-ASCII octets, I hope I replaced them correctly) >> so this does not seem any better than XORing without involving AES. > > Unless you can produce a particular encrypted counter value, the > presence of XOR doesn't change the unforgeability. I assume we need a new counter for each WS frame? Isn't it equivalent, but simpler, if each WS frame payload is XOR-ed by a random 128 bits mask. The mask is different from frame to frame, generated by the sender, and carried within the frame. - Zhong Yu
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking John Tamplin
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Bjoern Hoehrmann
- [hybi] More on Payload Masking Zhong Yu
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking John Tamplin
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking John Tamplin
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Greg Wilkins
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Willy Tarreau
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Scott Ferguson
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Zhong Yu
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Zhong Yu
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking John Tamplin
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Zhong Yu
- Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking Brodie Thiesfield