Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking

Zhong Yu <zhong.j.yu@gmail.com> Thu, 11 November 2010 20:16 UTC

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Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 14:16:51 -0600
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From: Zhong Yu <zhong.j.yu@gmail.com>
To: John Tamplin <jat@google.com>
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Cc: Hybi <hybi@ietf.org>, Bjoern Hoehrmann <derhoermi@gmx.net>
Subject: Re: [hybi] More on Payload Masking
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On Thu, Nov 11, 2010 at 1:30 PM, John Tamplin <jat@google.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 11, 2010 at 2:15 PM, Zhong Yu <zhong.j.yu@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> Unless you can produce a particular encrypted counter value, the
>>> presence of XOR doesn't change the unforgeability.
>>
>> I assume we need a new counter for each WS frame?
>
> No, as it the encrypted counter is not predictable.

I don't understand. In the attack scenario I described(now considered
less plausible), the attacker have full knowledge of the handshake and
some beginning WS frames. If the counter sequence used for these
beginning WS frames will continue to be used for some following WS
frames, attacker can craft some cybertext in the following bytes.

- Zhong Yu