Re: [hybi] Handshake was: The WebSocket protocol issues.

Adam Barth <ietf@adambarth.com> Tue, 12 October 2010 00:09 UTC

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From: Adam Barth <ietf@adambarth.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 2010 17:10:22 -0700
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To: Scott Ferguson <ferg@caucho.com>
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Cc: hybi <hybi@ietf.org>, Bjoern Hoehrmann <derhoermi@gmx.net>
Subject: Re: [hybi] Handshake was: The WebSocket protocol issues.
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On Mon, Oct 11, 2010 at 5:05 PM, Scott Ferguson <ferg@caucho.com> wrote:
> Adam Barth wrote:
>> On Mon, Oct 11, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Scott Ferguson <ferg@caucho.com> wrote:
>>> You didn't address point #6, the open DELETE.
>>>
>>> The target is pre-compromised because it has an open DELETE (point #6)
>>> and
>>> the target is pre-compromised because it's on the same machine as the
>>> attacker (point #1).
>>>
>>> You're requiring a pre-compromised target to make this attack work.
>>
>> I'm not sure what pre-compromised means.  I'm not sure that I'd run my
>> servers in this configuration, but that doesn't mean lots of other
>> people don't.
>
> 1. Your target has an open vulnerability ("DELETE") to non-browser clients
> 2. Your attacker is running an arbitrary program on the same machine as the
> target.
> 3. Your attacker has control over the target's web server.
>
> That target server is already under the control of the attacker. Adding a
> browser attack to that scenario is superfluous.

We'll just have to agree to disagree on that point.  This scenario is
one that browser vendors are interested in defending against.

Adam