[Ietf-dkim] RFC 8463: DNS textual form underspecified

Steffen Nurpmeso <steffen@sdaoden.eu> Sun, 14 April 2024 00:51 UTC

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Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2024 02:51:26 +0200
Author: Steffen Nurpmeso <steffen@sdaoden.eu>
From: Steffen Nurpmeso <steffen@sdaoden.eu>
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] RFC 8463: DNS textual form underspecified
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Hello.

Thanks to Hanno Böck (known from ossec and more) i was pointed to
my falsely published ED25519 DKIM key.
Until now that simply was the complete ED25519 public key, just
like for RSA, instead of extracting the actual "bitstring data"
from the standardized ASN.1 container, which starts at offset 16
(or -offset=12 if you use "openssl asn1parse -noout -out -" aka
the binary blob).

I realize that RFC 8463 says repeatedly that the base64-encoded
representation of an ED25519 key is 44 bytes, and that the
examples go for this.  Still there is no wording that the entire
ASN.1 structure shall be thrown away.

--steffen
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|Der Kragenbaer,                The moon bear,
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