[Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Proposal
Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> Sat, 19 September 2026 15:54 UTC
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From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
Date: Sat, 19 Sep 2026 08:54:29 -0700
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To: Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com>
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Proposal
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On Thu, Sep 17, 2026 at 4:42 AM Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > In message <CAAFsWK3t=fMTF=CfhiwtvgVER9ieyjvCwT6Um7DNYU5LFmnY7Q@mail.gma > il.com>, Wei Chuang <weihaw=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> writes > > > Also we can require the From header to be aligned at every SMTP > > transaction boundary which implies From header munging at those > > boundaries. > > to a first approximation no forwarding system does this today > > this is not going to fly > Not sure which part you disagree with. But AFAIK having DMARC evaluation done at i=n will require relay forwarders to always mangle the From header field before being sent to a DMARC mail receiver that will perform the evaluation. It's possible I'm overreading the relationship between draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec and this proposal, and if fact what you are proposing is to support i=1. If so, as Pietro points out, evaluating DMARC at i=1 can simplify this proposal. > > > FWIW the current I-D calls for that by default, though > > that's pretty onerous, and there is an explicit escape hatch with > > the "unaligned" flag. > > so something that no-one will switch over to doing has to be flagged up > specially in such a way that receivers will consider it dubious... > > ... though please recall the MAIL FROM (mf=) chain of custody already > requires an alignment at every hop and so it documents what has happened > to the mail and what systems did with it. This is of course just an > attestation and not something that anyone later in the chain can check, > but at least there is a clear record of what was said to have happened > and there so culpability can be pinned down if other forensic analysis > determines that systems have been trying to fool you. > > Anyway, I recommend rethinking what you are trying to achieve here and > aligning with how forwarding systems actually work. > > [then later in another reply....] > > > I guess this is saying that > > chain of custody can be verified to i=n (highest) but not to i=1 > > because the algebra doesn't work. To me that is WAI. Those > > earlier identities can't be claimed. > > if you cannot verify the signing all the way back to i=1 then the > message is NOT validly signed. > > The spec says that you only need to validate the highest numbered > DKIM2-Signature header field before accepting the message (and closing > the SMTP conversation and losing the opportunity to 5xx the transfer) > ... but before you do anything else you have to do a full check. > > Now by local policy (ie laziness) you may skip all the other checking, > but if so you will need to take steps to ensure that the message does > not then leave your organisation. > > Now quite WHY your local policy would be to avoid doing all the checks > back to i=1 in order to get all the warm and fuzzy feelings you would > get from knowing that the message was not completely forged by the > system that gave it to you I could not say. But local is local and not > for others to criticise. > > I very much agree. I will clean up the draft to remove support for i=n, the "unaligned" flag and mention of requiring alignment at every ADMD boundary. -Wei > - -- > richard @ highwayman . com "Nothing seems the same > Still you never see the change from day to day > And no-one notices the customs slip away" > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 > > iQA/AwUBaqvRu2HfC/FfW545EQKAxACg4rUrTjEI/xKfE/uZ1ZDUjf49BFcAoOMb > kc9tAPd7X4s2rreWdfEONIf7 > =fqAX > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > Ietf-dkim mailing list -- ietf-dkim@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to ietf-dkim-leave@ietf.org >
- [Ietf-dkim] DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Proposal Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Todd Herr
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Emanuel Schorsch
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Al Iverson
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Todd Herr
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Pr… MCN-IETF
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Al Iverson
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Emanuel Schorsch
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Emanuel Schorsch
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Pr… MCN-IETF
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Polic… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Emanuel Schorsch
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Tero Kivinen
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Emanuel Schorsch
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Emanuel Schorsch
- [Ietf-dkim] R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Pr… MCN-IETF
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Polic… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Polic… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Polic… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Polic… Vittorio
- [Ietf-dkim] R: Re: R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Po… MCN-IETF
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: R: Re: R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sende… Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Pete Resnick
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Emanuel Schorsch
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Pete Resnick
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Bron Gondwana
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… G.W. Haywood
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Bron Gondwana
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Richard Clayton
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Steffen Nurpmeso
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: R: Re: R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sende… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Polic… Taavi Eomäe
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: R: Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Polic… John Levine
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Wei Chuang
- [Ietf-dkim] Re: DKIM2 / DMARC Sender Policy Propo… Emanuel Schorsch