Re: [Ietf-dkim] Headers that should not be automatically oversigned in a DKIM signature?

Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> Mon, 05 February 2024 17:44 UTC

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Original-Subject: Re: [Ietf-dkim] Headers that should not be automatically oversigned in a DKIM signature?
Author: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
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Subject: Re: [Ietf-dkim] Headers that should not be automatically oversigned in a DKIM signature?
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On 05/02/2024 17:02, Hector Santos wrote:
>> On Feb 3, 2024, at 8:23 AM, Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> wrote:
>>
>> RFC 5322 specifies lists for From:, To:, Cc:, Bcc:, Reply-To:, 
>> Resent-From:, Resent-To:, Resent-Cc: and Resent-Bcc:.
>
> My comment was regarding the MUA and the order data is read. I wonder 
> which MUAs will display a list for Display fields From: and Resent-*. If 
> any.  Are all of these OverSign targets?


Resent-* fields can be added multiple times, so they should not be 
[over]signed.


> if we go down this road, the recommendation might be to always sign all 
> headers, including the missing, including ARC and trace headers and 
> before signing, reorder specific headers to DKIM-ready MUA read-order 
> standards, if any.


Trace fields, signatures and all "transit" stuff should neither be 
signed nor oversigned.


> Are MUAs now doing verifications and filtering failures?  Or is it the 
> backend, the host, the MDA, that is still generally responsible for 
> doing the verification and mail filtering before passing it on to users?


It is debatable whether it is useful to display authentication 
information to the end user.  Personally, I like to see it.

MUAs which have add-ons probably have one or more DKIM verifiers.  Some 
implement it natively.


Best
Ale
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