Re: [ietf-privacy] [Internet Policy] How a Radio Shack Robbery Could Spur a New Era in Digital Privacy

"John Levine" <> Tue, 28 November 2017 16:18 UTC

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Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 16:17:35 -0000
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From: John Levine <>
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Subject: Re: [ietf-privacy] [Internet Policy] How a Radio Shack Robbery Could Spur a New Era in Digital Privacy
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In article <> you write:
>So, it seems like (IANAL) one way to read the situation is that the government is currently trying to
>get companies to forcefully take the expectation of privacy off the table for commonly used
>communication tools.

I don't think that's the issue here.  The telcos have files full of
plaintext location information.  The question is who can look at them.

>I wonder what the analysis is WRT back doors vs. "keep the plaintext" (what they currently seem to be
>pursuing). The latter seems to sidestep the second test above...

That's a whole different can of worms. Access to the contents of
conversations has always required a warrant, and certain parts of law
enforcement believe that they have the right to force everyone else to
provide those contents in plaintext, regardless of what the laws of
mathematics might say.