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Re: More mail madness?

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 14 May 2018 17:02 UTC

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Subject: Re: More mail madness?
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Date: Mon, 14 May 2018 13:02:32 -0400
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> On May 14, 2018, at 12:35 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> 
> 
> So that’s the bandaid. What and where will work be done on a solution?

A CBC-MAC (or some other suitable ciphertext MAC) would probably help to
defeat tampering with the CBC ciphertext.  As would encrypt-then-sign
(rather than the more typical for S/MIME sign-then-encrypt), but S/MIME
signatures are optional, so a ciphertext MAC seems appropriate.

-- 
	Viktor.

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