RE: Last Call: <draft-kucherawy-marf-source-ports-03.txt> (Source Ports in ARF Reports) to Proposed Standard

Scott Kitterman <scott@kitterman.com> Tue, 08 May 2012 05:49 UTC

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Subject: RE: Last Call: <draft-kucherawy-marf-source-ports-03.txt> (Source Ports in ARF Reports) to Proposed Standard
From: Scott Kitterman <scott@kitterman.com>
Date: Tue, 08 May 2012 00:49:09 -0500
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"Murray S. Kucherawy" <msk@cloudmark.com> wrote:

>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ietf-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ietf-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
>Of Scott Kitterman
>> Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 3:35 PM
>> To: ietf@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-kucherawy-marf-source-ports-03.txt>
>(Source Ports in ARF Reports) to Proposed Standard
>> 
>> My suggestion would be to change the last part of section three to
>> read:
>> 
>>    When any authentication failure report [AUTHFAILURE-REPORT] is
>generated
>>    that includes the "Source-IP" reporting field (see Section 3.1 of
>>    [AUTHFAILURE-REPORT]]), this field MAY also be included.
>> 
>> Other than that, I think it's ready to go.
>
>If all one is doing is figuring out why something like a DKIM signature
>failed on an otherwise legitimate message, then I agree the source port
>isn't a useful input to that work.  In fact, as far as DKIM goes, the
>source IP address is probably not useful either.
>
>If, however, one is trying to track down the transmission of fraudulent
>email such as phishing attacks, source ports can be used to identify
>the perpetrator more precisely when compared to logs.  Support for this
>latter use case is why I believe RECOMMENDED is appropriate.

Which is exactly the case (abuse report) the second to last paragraph takes care of.  I agree RECOMMENDED is appropriate there and you have it there.

For auth failure analysis I read you as agreeing it's not needed.  There are some authorization methods that use IP address, so I don't think that for auth failure reports inclusion of IP address and source port are comparable.

Based on your response, I don't understand your objection to dropping the RECOMMENDS for auth failure reports and keeping it  for abuse reports?