Re: Last Call: <draft-kucherawy-marf-source-ports-03.txt> (Source Ports in ARF Reports) to Proposed Standard

Scott Kitterman <scott@kitterman.com> Wed, 09 May 2012 02:04 UTC

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From: Scott Kitterman <scott@kitterman.com>
To: "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-kucherawy-marf-source-ports-03.txt> (Source Ports in ARF Reports) to Proposed Standard
Date: Tue, 08 May 2012 22:04:30 -0400
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On Tuesday, May 08, 2012 06:23:46 AM Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: ietf-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ietf-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> > Scott Kitterman
 Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 10:49 PM
> > To: ietf@ietf.org
> > Subject: RE: Last Call: <draft-kucherawy-marf-source-ports-03.txt> (Source
> > Ports in ARF Reports) to Proposed Standard
 
> > 
> > >If all one is doing is figuring out why something like a DKIM signature
> > >failed on an otherwise legitimate message, then I agree the source port
> > >isn't a useful input to that work.  In fact, as far as DKIM goes, the
> > >source IP address is probably not useful either.
> > >
> > >If, however, one is trying to track down the transmission of fraudulent
> > >email such as phishing attacks, source ports can be used to identify
> > >the perpetrator more precisely when compared to logs.  Support for this
> > >latter use case is why I believe RECOMMENDED is appropriate.
> > 
> > 
> > Which is exactly the case (abuse report) the second to last paragraph
> > takes care of.  I agree RECOMMENDED is appropriate there and you have
> > it there.
> > 
> > For auth failure analysis I read you as agreeing it's not needed.
> > There are some authorization methods that use IP address, so I don't
> > think that for auth failure reports inclusion of IP address and source
> > port are comparable.
> > 
> > Based on your response, I don't understand your objection to dropping
> > the RECOMMENDS for auth failure reports and keeping it  for abuse
> > reports?
> 
> 
> I don't think it's possible for software to identify correctly a case of an
> accidental authentication failure versus detected fraud.  If it were, then
> I'd agree that for the simple authentication failure case the source port
> isn't useful.
 
Then why did we bother with a separate type or report for authentication 
failure?  Presumably we believe systems can have criteria for "I'm sending 
this because the message is abusive" versus "I'm sending this because it 
failed $authentication_type".

> In the absence of that capability, isn't it better to give the investigating
> user as much information as possible to use in correlation of logs and
> such?

Personally, in the forensic work I've done I've found things like mail queue 
IDs a lot more important than source port.  There is lots of information that 
would be useful for an investigation.  On this basis, I could see MAY include 
source port on auth failure reports, but I think making it RECOMMENDED on the 
basis of it may be useful is justified.

Scott K