Re: IAB statement on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-00
SM <sm@resistor.net> Wed, 27 November 2013 19:04 UTC
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Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2013 10:56:53 -0800
To: ietf@ietf.org
From: SM <sm@resistor.net>
Subject: Re: IAB statement on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-00
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At 08:13 27-11-2013, IAB Chair wrote: >At the Vancouver IETF meeting, the IAB held a technical plenary that >discussed pervasive monitoring. The IAB believes that pervasive >monitoring represents an attack on the The minutes for that plenary is not available at the moment. I would appreciate if the minutes could be published. > Internet in as much as large amounts of information that is > intended to be confidential between sets of individuals is in fact > gathered and aggregated by third parties. Such a broad scale > attack can undermine confidence in the infrastructure, no matter > the intent of those collecting the information. > >draft-farrell-perpass-attack-00 is intended to establish an IETF >community consensus on this matter. We encourage the community to >read and engage in discussion about this draft, and also to take >practical measures to limit pervasive monitoring within their environments. In Section 1: "that should be mitigated where possible via the design of protocols that make pervasive monitoring significantly more expensive or infeasible" That sounds like an arms race [1]. "A fuller problem statement with more examples and description can be found in [ProblemStatement]" That document is not available. "In particular, the term, when used technically, implies nothing about the motivation of the bad-actor mounting the attack, who is still called a bad-actor no matter what one really thinks about their motivation." The usual term in the IETF is "adversary" and not "bad-actor". "bad actor" is sometimes defined as "contentious individual". The Security Considerations section that the intended BCP is all about privacy. The Introduction section mentions "illegal purposes by criminals". I would describe the problem as having different angles; bad people could capture the information being exchanged and use it for nefarious purposes, nation states [2] can capture the information and use it to find out what the people are discussing. The draft is well-written. Given the catchy title I am left to wonder which parts of the document is polite fiction (a social scenario in which all participants are aware of a truth, but pretend to believe in some alternative version of events to avoid conflict or embarrassment). In very simplistic terms the draft says: "consensus to design protocols so as to mitigate the attack, where possible." Quoting Martin Thomson: we trusted you; we were naive; never again. Regards, -sm 1. the continuing competitive attempt by two or more nations each to have available to it more and more powerful weapons than the other(s). 2. http://ir.elbitsystems.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61849&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1810121&highlight=
- IAB statement on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-00 IAB Chair
- Re: IAB statement on draft-farrell-perpass-attack… SM
- Re: IAB statement on draft-farrell-perpass-attack… Mary Barnes
- Re: IAB statement on draft-farrell-perpass-attack… Stephen Farrell
- Re: IAB statement on draft-farrell-perpass-attack… Jari Arkko
- Re: IAB statement on draft-farrell-perpass-attack… SM
- Re: IAB statement on draft-farrell-perpass-attack… Abdussalam Baryun
- Re: IAB statement on draft-farrell-perpass-attack… SM
- Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… Martin Millnert
- RE: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response… JOSEFSSON Erik
- perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01 Bruce Perens
- RE: perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01 l.wood
- Re: perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01 Ted Lemon