Re: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-09

["Martin Thomson" <[e-mail]>]

On Sat, Jul 20, 2019, at 21:57, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > already supported by TLS libraries? Also, are we in effect deprecating this TLS
> > 1.3 feature because of the security issue of the mismatched record boundaries?
> 
> I think in some peoples' minds that would be a good thing, though it's not
> entirely clear that we are actually doing so.

This wouldn't deprecate post-HS auth.  It is intended to cover the cases where post-HS auth does not work.  See draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-secondary-certs.

> > "SHOULD use TLS", change to MUST. There's no way it can work otherwise anyway.
> 
> What about QUIC?

I think that we can safely regard QUIC (at least those versions that use TLS) as TLS.  An informative mention might help avoid any confusion regarding this point.  We might also regard DTLS-SRTP as one such protocol.

> > * Is
> > there a requirement for all protocol messages to be sent over a single TLS
> > connection? If so, please mention it. Certainly this is true for the
> > Authenticator message that must be sent over a single connection and cannot be
> > multiplexed by the high-level protocol. I think this protocol actually assumes
> > "nice" transport properties (no message reorder, reliability) that also require
> > a single, clean TLS connection.
> 
> It seems like we should be more clear about what we do (and do not)
> require.  Though IIRC we can do separate authenticators in parallel and not
> require them to be ordered with respect to each other.

See above regarding DTLS-SRTP.  Being too crisp might constrain usage inappropriately.

> > * Why no authenticator request for servers?
> > Don't we care about replay? OTOH if the client wants to detect replays, it
> > would need to keep state on received authenticators, which would be very messy.
> 
> IIUC the thinking is that there's no way to revoke an authenticator for a
> connection, so replay (if  not detected by another layer anyway) would not
> cause the authentication state to change.

Ben is correct.

> > *  7.1: this is
> > changing TLS 1.3 by allowing this extension in Cert Request! I think it's a
> > really bad idea. Better to hack special support to existing libraries, allowing
> > this specific extension for this special case, than to change the base
> > protocol. Otherwise, this document should UPDATE 8446.
> 
> Or, since extension codepoints are cheap, just use a newcodepoint.

We might want to discuss this one this week if we can.