Re: secdir review of draft-raj-dhc-tftp-addr-option-04

John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com> Tue, 02 December 2008 20:54 UTC

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Date: Tue, 02 Dec 2008 15:53:58 -0500
From: John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com>
To: Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>, Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>
Subject: Re: secdir review of draft-raj-dhc-tftp-addr-option-04
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Cc: dhc Chairs <dhc-chairs@tools.ietf.org>, Richard Johnson <raj@cisco.com>, IESG IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, IETF Discussion <ietf@ietf.org>, secdir@ietf.org
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--On Tuesday, 02 December, 2008 15:23 -0500 Ralph Droms
<rdroms@cisco.com> wrote:

> Sam - I think most of the issues in your review of
> draft-raj-dhc-tftp-addr-option-04 can be resolved by reviewing
> the purposes of RFC 3942 and publishing Informational RFCs
> describing DHCP option codes.  Fundamentally, the reason to
> publish RFCs under the process described in RFC 3942 is to
> document existing uses of option codes in the range of option
> codes reclaimed for assignment to new DHCP options.  The
> concern is to avoid conflicts between new options and those
> grandfathered ("hijacked") option codes.  As such, these RFCs
> (usually Informational) simply document the already
>...
> Responding to some of your specific points:
> 
>>> At the very least, I suggest mandating the use of DHCP Auth
>>> and   removing the suggestion to use option 66 to enhance
>>> security.  And,   in the absence of a more data about how
>>> widely used this option is,   I suggest not publishing this
>>> document at all.
> 
> The consensus of the dhc WG, to which I concur, is to publish
> the document as Informational. The text in the Security
> Considerations section about option 66 might be removed.
>...
> To reiterate, it's not so much a question of whether a new
> code point is needed; rather, according to the procedures
> described in RFC 3942, this document gives a description of an
> existing use of option code 150.  That option code is in use
>...

Ralph,

It seems to me that there is a middle ground here.   One can
stick with Informational publication as the WG intends, but
still modify the Security Considerations section, not only to
remove the reference to option 66 (if there is consensus that is
appropriate) but to add some explanation about why the use of
this option without authentication might be problematic.

Put differently, your objection to Sam's suggestion seems to
hinge on "just describe the existing practice, don't try to
change it in this document". Given RFC 3492, that is entirely
reasonable.  But, if there are relatively obvious difficulties
with that practice, it seems to me that documenting them would
be helpful (indeed that not doing so borders on irresponsible).

    john


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