Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-crypto-09.txt> (A new cryptographic signature method for DKIM) to Proposed Standard

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Wed, 30 May 2018 21:28 UTC

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Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-crypto-09.txt> (A new cryptographic signature method for DKIM) to Proposed Standard
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Wed, 30 May 2018 17:28:49 -0400
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To: John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>
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> On May 30, 2018, at 4:59 PM, John Levine <johnl@taugh.com> wrote:
> 
> In article <D4920629-1B2C-4123-A2FC-209A4986C8C4@vigilsec.com> you write:
>> I have three comments on draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-crypto-09.
>> 
>> In section 3, this document says that it uses "PureEDdSA"; however, RFC 8032 provide a definition for PureEdDSA.  I
>> assume this is a simple typo.
> 
> yEs

As assumed....

> 
>> How hard would it be to expand section 6 to include an example of two selectors being used, one with RSA and one with
>> ed25519?  If it is pretty easy, I think it would help the reader.
> 
> I can ask the guy who produced the example.  It shouldn't be very hard.

Cool.

> 
>> RFC 6376 have an extensive security considerations section.  This document should point out that the private key
>> protection discussed in Section 8.3 of RFC 6376 applies to the ed25519 private key.  In addition, I think there should
>> be a section similar to Section 8.13 of RFC 6376 in this document; it might just be a pointer to Section 8 of RFC 8032.
> 
> I don't disagree with any of the points but it all seems so obvious
> other than perhaps the pointer to the 8032 security section.  I'm
> trying to envision the person who has sufficient skill to add EC keys
> to his DKIM setup but has to be reminded that it would still be a bad
> idea to publish the public keys.
> 
> Perhaps I can add a sentence saying that all of the security advice in
> 6376 applies except that the advice in 8032 supercedes the
> RSA-specific advice.

Actually, that would be sufficient.

Russ