Re: DNSCurve vs. DNSSEC - FIGHT! (was OpenDNS today announced it has adopted DNSCurve to secure DNS)

jnc@mercury.lcs.mit.edu (Noel Chiappa) Fri, 26 February 2010 00:48 UTC

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Subject: Re: DNSCurve vs. DNSSEC - FIGHT! (was OpenDNS today announced it has adopted DNSCurve to secure DNS)
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Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2010 19:50:48 -0500
From: jnc@mercury.lcs.mit.edu
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    > From: Shumon Huque <shuque@isc.upenn.edu>

    > Any of them, whether by malice or by being tricked, can issue a
    > certificate for any of your services. Our security is basically as good
    > as the the CA with the laxest policies & worst security.

Sounds like a poor attribute for a security architeture...

	Noel