Re: [Int-area] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-intarea-probe-09: (with COMMENT)

Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> Thu, 14 December 2017 23:23 UTC

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From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2017 17:23:25 -0600
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To: Ron Bonica <rbonica@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-intarea-probe-09: (with COMMENT)
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> On Dec 14, 2017, at 11:03 AM, Ron Bonica <rbonica@juniper.net> wrote:
> 
> Hi Ben,
> 
> Thanks for the review. Comments inline.....
> 
>                    Ron
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Ben Campbell [mailto:ben@nostrum.com]
>> Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 10:11 PM
>> To: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
>> Cc: draft-ietf-intarea-probe@ietf.org; Luigi Iannone <ggx@gigix.net>;
>> intarea-chairs@ietf.org; ggx@gigix.net; int-area@ietf.org
>> Subject: Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-intarea-probe-09: (with
>> COMMENT)

[…]

> [RB ]
> I respectfully disagree. If PROBE leaks information between routing instances, we will have created a rather serious security vulnerability. So, this is a standing-on-our-heads-serious requirement.

I agree it’s really important, but it’s still a statement of fact. It’s not normative in the sense that it doesn’t offer instruction to implementers so much as it offers a reason for the _next_ requirement:

"Therefore, when a node receives an ICMP Extended Echo Request and the proxy interface is in a different VPN than the probed interface, the node MUST return an ICMP Extended Echo Reply with error code equal to (2) No Such Interface. “

Isn’t _that_ the real normative requirement?

In any case, this is not a blocking comment, so feel free to ignore it :-)

Thanks!

Ben.





> 
>                                                                                       Ron
> 
>