Re: [ippm] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-option-tlv-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Greg Mirsky <[e-mail]>]

Hi Martin,
I've applied the updates suggested by Ben to the working version (attached
along with the diff). I'll be glad to upload the new version if that helps.

Regards,
Greg

On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 12:04 PM Martin Duke <[e-mail]> wrote:

> I believe the current status of this is that Ben is awaiting another
> version of this draft to resolve his DISCUSS. If anyone has a different
> understanding, please say so.
>
> On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 12:44 PM Greg Mirsky <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> Hi Ben,
>> thank you for your comments and suggestions, all are much appreciated.
>> Please find my notes in-lined below tagged by GIM>>. Attached are the diff
>> and the new working version of the draft.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Greg
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 1, 2020 at 8:55 PM Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <
>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
>>> draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-option-tlv-09: Discuss
>>>
>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>>
>>>
>>> Please refer to
>>> https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>>
>>>
>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-option-tlv/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> DISCUSS:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> Thanks for all the updates; we've made good progress.
>>>
>>> I think we're still not converged on the DSCP handling, though.  I have
>>> a bit more exposition in the COMMENT section, but in short, my
>>> understanding is that we're setting up a session-reflector to incur
>>> unbounded levels of risk with hard protocol requirements.  I think we
>>> need to provide a way to bound that risk, for example by allowing the
>>> Session-Reflector to selectively choose to treat the CoS TLV as
>>> unimplemented (set the U flag in its reflected packet) or some other
>>> mechanism for local policy to filter what DSCP codepoints are set in
>>> reflected packets (ideally, indicating that the policy made a change).
>>>
>> GIM>> Thank you for pointing to the inter-QoS domain scenario. Clearly,
>> it must be handled with more caution. Using the U flag is a very
>> interesting approach. But wouldn't the Session-Sender skip the CoS TLV in
>> the reflected packet? As a result, we may not retrieve information about
>> the CoS mapping in the forward direction, i.e., towards the
>> Session-Reflector. And it might be difficult for an operator to recognize
>> whether the Session-Reflector doesn't support the particular CoS or STAMP
>> extensions altogether. I would propose a new field being added in the CoS
>> TLV:
>>
>>    -    RP (Reverse Path) - is a two-bit-long field.  A Session-Sender
>>       MUST set the value of the RP field to 0 on transmission.
>>
>> And further in the section another update:
>>    A STAMP Session-Reflector that receives a test packet with the CoS
>>    TLV MUST include the CoS TLV in the reflected test packet.  Also, the
>>    Session-Reflector MUST copy the value of the DSCP and ECN fields of
>>    the IP header of the received STAMP test packet into the DSCP2 field
>>    in the reflected test packet.  Finally, the Session-Reflector MUST
>>    use the local policy to verify whether the CoS corresponding to the
>>    value of the DSCP1 field is permitted in the domain.  If it is, the
>>    Session-Reflectorset MUST set the DSCP field's value in the IP header
>>    of the reflected test packet equal to the value of the DSCP1 field of
>>    the received test packet.  Otherwise, the Session-Reflector MUST use
>>    the DSCP value of the received STAMP packet and set the value of the
>>    RP field to 1.  Upon receiving the reflected packet, if the value of
>>    the RP field is 0, the Session-Sender will save the DSCP and ECN
>>    values for analysis of the CoS in the reverse direction.  If the
>>    value of the RP field in the received reflected packet is 1, only CoS
>>    in the forward direction can be analyzed.
>>
>> Would these updates address your concern?
>>
>>>
>>> Also, there's a bit of fallout from the flags reworking that's left to
>>> cleanup in Section 4: we now have the Session-Sender set the U flag to
>>> 1, so this text no longer makes sense:
>>>
>>> % A STAMP system, i.e., either a Session-Sender or a Session-Reflector,
>>> % that has received a STAMP test packet with extension TLVs MUST
>>> % validate each TLV:
>>> %
>>> %    If the U flag is set, the STAMP system MUST skip the processing of
>>> %    the TLV.
>>>
>>> I think it should just apply to the Session-Sender for this case -- the
>>> Session-Reflector doesn't need to check the received U flag, since the
>>> Session-Sender will not be generating TLVs it does not understand.
>>> (Whether or not to keep the behavior for the M and I flags as applying
>>> to both Session-Sender and Session-Reflector vs. just Session-Sender
>>> does not immediately seem to be of much consequence.
>>>
>> GIM>> Thank you for catching this. Indeed, that brakes STAMP with
>> extensions. I think that though checking M and I flags of a
>> Session-Reflector should not do any harm, it doesn't seem to have any
>> benefits. Hence we may remove the Session-Reflector from the sentence and
>> the updated introduction to the flag processing reads like below:
>>    A STAMP Session-Sender that has received a reflected STAMP test
>>    packet with extension TLVs MUST validate each TLV:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> COMMENT:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> My most significant remaining comments are on the Security
>>> Considerations (Section 6):
>>>
>>> The security of the HMAC mechanism is not complete, since it is
>>> susceptible to replay attack.  As such, when HMAC is in use, it is
>>> important to check that the received sequence numbers are (at least
>>> mostly) monotonic and to detect replays.  While replayed packets do not
>>> always indicate an attack (depending on the network technology) they are
>>> still a noteworthy condition, and we should say something about whether
>>> we expect to produce a response to each received instance or to suppress
>>> replies to replayed input.
>>>
>> GIM>> Is there a reliable mechanism to distinguish between an
>> out-of-order duplicated packet and a replayed packet? I've checked RFC 5357
>> TWAMP for any suggestion and believe that there is no special consideration
>> by a Session-Reflector for an out-of-order duplicated packet. The TWAMP
>> Session-Reflector does not monitor whether the sequence numbers of the
>> received test packets are in the monotonically increasing sequence. STAMP
>> is designed to be comparable with TWAMP and have some level of
>> interoperability. Hence, discarding what appears as a replayed packet at a
>> STAMP Session-Reflector might be less desirable behavior. If we follow
>> TWAMP's behavior, what else can be done at the Session-Reflector to
>> strengthen the security?
>>
>>>
>>>    Monitoring and optional control of DSCP do not appear to introduce
>>>    any additional security threat to hosts that communicate with STAMP
>>>    as defined in [RFC8762].  As this specification defined the mechanism
>>>    to test DSCP mapping, this document inherits all the security
>>>
>>> I'm afraid I still don't understand the reasoning here.  In my
>>> understanding, the risk stems from the semantics of the DCSP field being
>>> (for at least some codepoints) site-local, there not being a guarantee
>>> that the session-sender and session-reflector are on the same network
>>> (and thus, using the same DSCP semantics), and the hard requirement for
>>> the Session-Reflector to set the DCSP value indicated by the
>>> Session-Sender.  A mechanism for a remote entity to induce generation of
>>> local packets with unspecified semantics is a risk that cannot be
>>> qualified at protocol-design time, since the possible outcomes are
>>> inherently unspecified.  This is analogous to the situation with
>>> undefined behavior in programming languages like C -- the programmer is
>>> flat-out required to avoid it, because literally anything could go wrong
>>> if undefined behavior is triggered.
>>>
>> GIM>> I agree that the inter-QoS domain case requires more consideration
>> in the Security section. I propose the updated text below:
>>
>>    As this specification defined the mechanism to test DSCP mapping,
>>    this document inherits all the security considerations discussed in
>>    [RFC2474].  Monitoring and optional control of DSCP using the CoS TLV
>>    may be used across the Internet so that the Session-Sender and the
>>    Session-Reflector are located in domains that use different CoS
>>    profiles.  Thus, it is essential that an operator verifies the set of
>>    CoS values that are used in the Session-Reflector's domain.  Also, an
>>    implementation of a Session-Reflector SHOULD support a local policy
>>    to confirm whether the value sent by the Session-Sender can be used
>>    as the value of the DSCP field.  Section 4.4 defines the use of that
>>    local policy.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> This is especially risky when there is the possibility for the
>>> Session-Reflector to act on packets that do not have any form of
>>> authentication (i.e., could be spoofed from off-path).  But we do not
>>> mention this risk at all, let alone give guidance on its mitigation.
>>> (Discussion of the security considerations of unauthenticated operation
>>> would ideally be generalized to all actions/TLVs that have side effects,
>>> not just the specific case of setting the DSCP codepoint.)
>>>
>> GIM>> It seems very challenging for a STAMP system to differentiate
>> between a duplicate and/or out-of-order test packet and a replayed packet
>> because one of the metrics STAMP test measures is the network re-ordering
>> metric per RFC 4737 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4737>. We may
>> recommend that the rate-limiting of test packets be selected
>> conservatively.
>>
>>>
>>> Section 4.2
>>>
>>> I'd suggest saying that all fields that are not filled are transmitted
>>> with all bits set to zero.
>>>
>> GIM>> Thank you for the helpful suggestion. Appended Section 4.2:
>>    Note that all fields not filled by either a Session-Sender or
>>    Session-Reflector are transmitted with all bits set to zero.
>>
>>>
>>> Section 4.2.1
>>>
>>>    o  Source MAC Address sub-TLV - is a 12-octet-long sub-TLV.  The Type
>>>       value is TBA9.  The value of the Length field MUST equal to 8.
>>>       The Value field is a 12-octet-long MBZ field that MUST be zeroed
>>>       on transmission and ignored on receipt.
>>>
>>> Value should be 8-octets-long, no?
>>>
>> GIM>> Thank you for catching it! You are absolutely correct. Fixed this
>> and a similar in:
>>    o  Source EUI-64 Address sub-TLV - is a 12-octet-long sub-TLV that
>>       includes the EUI-64 source MAC address.  The Type value is TBA11.
>>       The value of the Length field MUST equal to 8.  The Value field
>>       consists of an eight-octet-long EUI-64 field.
>>
>>
>>
>>> Section 4.2.2
>>>
>>>    A Session-Sender MAY include the Source MAC Address sub-TLV is the
>>>    Location TLV.  If the Session-Reflector receives the Location TLV
>>>
>>> nit: s/is/in/
>>>
>> GIM>> Thank you. Fixed (and three more places in the same sub-section).
>>
>>>
>>> Section 4.3
>>>
>>>    MUST NOT fill any information fields except for STAMP TLV Flags,
>>>    Type, and Length.  All other fields MUST be filled with zeroes The
>>>
>>> nit: missing full stop.
>>>
>> GIM>> Done.
>>
>