IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [IPsec] Labeled IPsec options

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Thu, 12 December 2019 21:15 UTC

Return-Path: <paul@nohats.ca>
X-Original-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5AB15120044 for <ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 12 Dec 2019 13:15:38 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.998
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.998 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=nohats.ca
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xYm-0TaxowHd for <ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 12 Dec 2019 13:15:36 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx.nohats.ca (mx.nohats.ca [IPv6:2a03:6000:1004:1::68]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B8AEE120024 for <ipsec@ietf.org>; Thu, 12 Dec 2019 13:15:36 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by mx.nohats.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47YmmR2n3pzDZK; Thu, 12 Dec 2019 22:15:35 +0100 (CET)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=nohats.ca; s=default; t=1576185335; bh=47au5qALF4NnudvkmotmwonirO2hVlcieYfPrhtHuPw=; h=Date:From:To:cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References; b=CmZoofiMvdKNQtXD09fDHQg97cgNloA0ELxBioLRK49lL+oKyLNSsMhrLOwwirrbv fUjJwlXMzJVB1gsq5LbJ4jHTVvfnOEQP56Gnnu/GlZ9vJfYjRv9J71O3SH6ssjatRD BFHzoUgOok81DcSmWl47PA1nVwAjhzDImNTyDsEg=
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at mx.nohats.ca
Received: from mx.nohats.ca ([IPv6:::1]) by localhost (mx.nohats.ca [IPv6:::1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id a9b4_rJ8zOxJ; Thu, 12 Dec 2019 22:15:34 +0100 (CET)
Received: from bofh.nohats.ca (bofh.nohats.ca [76.10.157.69]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx.nohats.ca (Postfix) with ESMTPS; Thu, 12 Dec 2019 22:15:34 +0100 (CET)
Received: by bofh.nohats.ca (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 192D16007ADD; Thu, 12 Dec 2019 16:15:33 -0500 (EST)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bofh.nohats.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 152F7308EC; Thu, 12 Dec 2019 16:15:33 -0500 (EST)
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 16:15:33 -0500
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
cc: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>, ipsec@ietf.org, 'Sahana Prasad' <sahana@redhat.com>
In-Reply-To: <24050.43728.115813.170898@fireball.acr.fi>
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1912121614440.22484@bofh.nohats.ca>
References: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1912092333560.23963@bofh.nohats.ca> <01f501d5b0b2$facb4370$f061ca50$@gmail.com> <24050.43728.115813.170898@fireball.acr.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"; format="flowed"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/1l8eStBt_0gWRmzPQ1UJamcWRCk>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Labeled IPsec options
X-BeenThere: ipsec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion of IPsec protocols <ipsec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ipsec/>
List-Post: <mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 21:15:38 -0000

On Thu, 12 Dec 2019, Tero Kivinen wrote:

>> Option 1 looks like the clearest from pure theoretical point of view,
>> however I agree that it could lead to TS types explosion in future.
>
> Yes, I think option 1 would be most proper way of doing the
> negotiation. I am not sure if we are going to get that many new
> traffic selectors in the future, so I do not think the TS types
> explosion is going to be that big issue.

That is fair.

> If it gets same information during IKE_SA_INIT (missing
> SECLABELS_SUPPORTED), it cannot trust that thing yet as other end is
> not authenticated, so it will need to run IKE_AUTH to the end anyways
> to make sure that there was no attack removing that
> SECLABELS_SUPPORTED notification. So it will detect that error at the
> end of IKE_AUTH always.
>
> In that case there is no point of adding notification to the
> IKE_SA_INIT.

Indeed.

PUL

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email