Re: [IPsec] Labeled IPsec options

"Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com> Fri, 13 December 2019 14:52 UTC

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From: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: 'Paul Wouters' <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org, 'Sahana Prasad' <sahana@redhat.com>
References: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1912092333560.23963@bofh.nohats.ca> <01f501d5b0b2$facb4370$f061ca50$@gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.21.1912121606130.22484@bofh.nohats.ca> <046001d5b1c1$232c7be0$698573a0$@gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.21.1912130928540.8529@bofh.nohats.ca>
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Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2019 17:52:49 +0300
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Labeled IPsec options
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> >> I don't think that matters. Security labels are never optional but
> >> always mandatory. And it seems very unlikely to have a mix of child
> >> sa's with and without label. So they will all have a label, and then
> >> failing the  IKE SA is fine,
> >
> > Do you want to say, that it's impossible to have two SGWs with
> > multiple networks behind them so, that traffic from some networks will
> > have security labels and traffic from the others won't have?
> 
> I'm not saying it is impossible. I am saying it is not likely to be a real
life
> configuration. If you classify network traffic with labels, your goal is
to not
> have unlabeled traffic come in at all. You might have a label
SEC_WHATEVER,
> but it still seems far more likely you would mark the traffic as having
come
> from SGWx with some kind of LABELx to track the origin throughout your
> network.
> 
> > If such a configuration is possible, then it's perfectly OK to have a
> > mix of labelled and non-labelled IPsec SAs created by one IKE SA.
> 
> I'd argue the reverse. It would likely be better not to allow such an
awful
> configuration :)

So, am I right that you want all IPsec SAs created from a single IKE SA to
either
have labels or not? If so, then it looks like an IKE SA property, and thus
an ability
to use labels should really be negotiated when IKE SA is created
(well, I don't care whether it is SECLABELS_SUPPORTED or SECLABELS_REQUIRED 
notification :-)). And since peers know that seclabels are supported, we
won't
have any problems with legacy implementations (for example, the responder
cannot ignore label in notification in option 3).

Regards,
Valery.

> 
> Paul