Re: [IPsec] a new IKEv2 labeled security draft is published

Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Mon, 02 August 2010 15:23 UTC

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From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
To: "David P. Quigley" <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Date: Mon, 02 Aug 2010 11:24:16 -0400
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Cc: ipsec@ietf.org, jarrett.lu@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [IPsec] a new IKEv2 labeled security draft is published
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On Mon, 2010-08-02 at 10:32 -0400, David P. Quigley wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-08-02 at 10:12 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > I would encourage you to publish the LFS draft as soon as possible so
> > that we can take a look at both specifications together since the IKE
> > draft does have some reliance on the LFS draft.
> 
> That's a good idea. I just published the document. You can find it at
> the link below[1]. I also posted an email about it to the SAAG so
> hopefully there will be some review from there as well.
> 
> [1]http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-quigley-label-format-registry-00.txt

Thank you.

> > While leaving large chunks of the protocol out of the specification
> > definitely makes it easier to draft (and review for that matter), it
> > makes me very nervous when people start implementing the specification
> > later down the line as the assumptions you make when developing
> > implementation "A" might not work well with the assumptions I make with
> > developing implementation "B".  For something as critical as a security
> > label protocol, this could have very serious repercussions for users.
> > 
> > Granted, it is probably foolish (and perhaps not very desirable either)
> > to ask for a specification that completely removes all ambiguity, but I
> > think the IKE security label draft as currently written is far too vague
> > to be useful.  Look at the CALIPSO RFC or even the other IPsec/IKE RFCs
> > to see the level of specification detail that, in my opinion, should be
> > present in an IETF RFC. 
> 
> We are accepting text for the document so if there is something you
> believe that should be in it such as handling unauthorized labels feel
> free to write up some text and send it our way.

Perhaps it would be better for you to document how you would assume the
implementation to work with a level of detail similar to the other IKE
and CALIPSO RFCs and then we can have another attempt at review?  I'm
saying this not to be difficult, but rather because I feel that
providing the amount of additional text that I feel is needed would be
roughly the same as writing a draft in the first place.  To be honest, I
look at this draft as an abstract for labeled IKE specification, not a
draft specification itself.

-- 
paul moore
linux @ hp