Re: [IPsec] a new IKEv2 labeled security draft is published

Jarrett Lu <jarrett.lu@oracle.com> Mon, 02 August 2010 16:08 UTC

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Date: Mon, 02 Aug 2010 09:09:33 -0700
From: Jarrett Lu <jarrett.lu@oracle.com>
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To: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
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Cc: ipsec@ietf.org, "David P. Quigley" <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] a new IKEv2 labeled security draft is published
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Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-08-02 at 10:32 -0400, David P. Quigley wrote:
>   
>> On Mon, 2010-08-02 at 10:12 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
>>     
>>> I would encourage you to publish the LFS draft as soon as possible so
>>> that we can take a look at both specifications together since the IKE
>>> draft does have some reliance on the LFS draft.
>>>       
>> That's a good idea. I just published the document. You can find it at
>> the link below[1]. I also posted an email about it to the SAAG so
>> hopefully there will be some review from there as well.
>>
>> [1]http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-quigley-label-format-registry-00.txt
>>     
>
> Thank you.
>
>   
>>> While leaving large chunks of the protocol out of the specification
>>> definitely makes it easier to draft (and review for that matter), it
>>> makes me very nervous when people start implementing the specification
>>> later down the line as the assumptions you make when developing
>>> implementation "A" might not work well with the assumptions I make with
>>> developing implementation "B".  For something as critical as a security
>>> label protocol, this could have very serious repercussions for users.
>>>
>>> Granted, it is probably foolish (and perhaps not very desirable either)
>>> to ask for a specification that completely removes all ambiguity, but I
>>> think the IKE security label draft as currently written is far too vague
>>> to be useful.  Look at the CALIPSO RFC or even the other IPsec/IKE RFCs
>>> to see the level of specification detail that, in my opinion, should be
>>> present in an IETF RFC. 
>>>       
>> We are accepting text for the document so if there is something you
>> believe that should be in it such as handling unauthorized labels feel
>> free to write up some text and send it our way.
>>     
>
> Perhaps it would be better for you to document how you would assume the
> implementation to work with a level of detail similar to the other IKE
> and CALIPSO RFCs and then we can have another attempt at review?  I'm
> saying this not to be difficult, but rather because I feel that
> providing the amount of additional text that I feel is needed would be
> roughly the same as writing a draft in the first place.  To be honest, I
> look at this draft as an abstract for labeled IKE specification, not a
> draft specification itself.
>   

I suppose we can add more details / text on label validations and error
handling to avoid implementation ambiguities as much as possible. Our
intent is to add the label negotiation as a simple extension to IKEv2. It
really should be a short document.

Thanks.

Jarrett