Re: [IPsec] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sprasad-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-00.txt (fwd)

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Wed, 07 March 2018 01:53 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2018 20:52:55 -0500
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: "Hu, Jun (Nokia - US/Mountain View)" <jun.hu@nokia.com>
cc: "ipsec@ietf.org WG" <ipsec@ietf.org>, Sahana Prasad <sahana.prasad07@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sprasad-ipsecme-labeled-ipsec-00.txt (fwd)
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On Tue, 6 Mar 2018, Hu, Jun (Nokia - US/Mountain View) wrote:

> Some initial questions/comments:
> 1. security label is defined as opaque data in the draft, but then how would narrowing work in an inter-op way with opaque data? Or should we define the format for some common use cases (like security enforcement, QoS ...) , and adding a sub-type in TS_SECLABEL

The idea was that people should be able to define this outside of IKE as
they wish. And IKE just transports the label as-is. Of course, if IKE
can interpret it to do something, then it can possibly do more, like
narrowing.

I think usually the two endpoints will only have one type of SECLABEL,
so the type is implicit to the IKE protocol. If you have different
subtypes, then presumably if the subtype is wrong, you can't accept
it, so the type is already known on both ends and doesn't need to
have its own registry?

> 2. currently there are TSi (44) and TSr (45) payload, does it make sense to include TS_SECLABEL in either TSi or TSr? Is there semantic to have separate "initiator SECLABEL" and "responder SECLABEL"? Or does it make more sense to only allow single TS_SECLABEL per message/CHILD_SA, and create a new TS payload type , put TS_SECLABEL in it ?

That would be giving it another Payload Type. I think it is really a
traffic selector type payload, and not a non-traffic-selector payload.

Even if it is true that the label on both ends have to always match.
But that's kind of similar to address family always needing to match.

Although there might be a case where one end is allowed to send traffic
with SECLABEL Foo, but not allowed to receive traffic with that label,
where TSi could contain a TS_SECLABEL entry, and TSr would not.

Another case that probably needs some attention is when there is more
then one TS_SECLABEL. Does it mean two different types of security
labels are meant, and both have to match? Or is it okay to pick any one
of the labels?

Paul