Re: [IPsec] Proposed method to achieve quantum resistant IKEv2

[Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>]

Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <[e-mail]> wrote:
    > EAP; frankly, I’m not that familiar with EAP, however, if EAP isn’t currently
    > postquantum secure, it may make sense for that protocol to be updated.

EAP is a framework for a set of algorithms, some of which are are as stupid
as "send the cleartext password", to CHAP-methods, to run some variation
of TLS and do something else inside the TLS. (Yes, you can run EAP inside
the TLS, and recursive...)

Key generating EAP methods (of which passwords are not an example), deliver
the same key to both ends securely, which in some situations is used to
authenticate something else.  In WPA/1x, it becomes your WEP key.

In IKEv2, we can use EAP in addition to other methods; the gateway machine
will often authenticate with a certificate.  So if the certificate is
post-quantum, is it enough to have half-duplex resistance?  I suspect not.

(I didn't read the rest of your message yet)


--
Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-