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Re: [IPsec] Proposed method to achieve quantum resistant IKEv2

"Graham Bartlett (grbartle)" <grbartle@cisco.com> Wed, 27 September 2017 20:04 UTC

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From: "Graham Bartlett (grbartle)" <grbartle@cisco.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "ipsec@ietf.org" <ipsec@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [IPsec] Proposed method to achieve quantum resistant IKEv2
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Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2017 20:04:41 +0000
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Proposed method to achieve quantum resistant IKEv2
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Hi Michael

Is the main rational for not having fragmentation in IKE_SA_INIT that it could break the features of IKE that you list below?

The reason I ask, we’re working on the current draft and looking to implement optional fragmentation in the IKE_SA_INIT, but this would be friendly to cookies, TCP encaps, NAT-T etc

cheers

On 09/08/2017, 19:00, "IPsec on behalf of Michael Richardson" <ipsec-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:

    I agree.  All of the DoS (cookie, etc.) defense and switch to TCP, and
    detection of NAT-T, etc. is in the IKE_SA_INIT, and so doing any kind of
    framentation in IKE_SA_INIT is a bad idea.

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