Re: [IPsec] draft-pauly-ipsecme-split-dns

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 19 June 2018 20:27 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2018 13:20:15 -0700
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-ipsecme-split-dns.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ipsecme-split-dns.all@ietf.org>, "Waltermire, David A. (Fed)" <david.waltermire@nist.gov>, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] draft-pauly-ipsecme-split-dns
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On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 1:00 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Tue, 19 Jun 2018, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> The ID can say that, but as a practical matter, any enterprise that has
>> a reasonable number of internal domains is just going to tell people
>> to configure their client to accept any domain name.
>>
>
> Which is the equivalent of an enterprise that requires you to accept the
> TLS middleware box and its additional webpki CAs. Except we made it more
> restrained to prevent abuse.
>

I'd prefer to establish the facts of the matter before we debate what
ought to happen.

My contention here is that as a practical matter, many clients will be
required
to accept any domain name that the VPN server asserts is internal. As far
as I can tell, this is what the document itself says:

   In most deployment scenario's, the IKE client has an expectation that
   it is connecting, using a split-network setup, to a specific
   organisation or enterprise.  A recommended policy would be to only
   accept INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA directives from that organization's DNS
   names.  However, this might not be possible in all deployment
   scenarios, such as one where the IKE server is handing out a number
   of domains that are not within one parent domain.

What am I misunderstanding?


All that is needed is to be able to authenticate the VPN server itself.
>>
>
> This draft has nothing to do with authentication of the VPN server. That
> is all done in IKE, possibly with certificates, but nothing related to
> DNS whatsoever. This draft is about using a split-DNS setup where the
> VPN client can keep using its own validating DNSSEC capable recursive
> server, while allowing a cryptographic acception for mutually agreed
> enterprise domains while still supporting DNSSEC for those enterprise
> domains to protect against inside attackers.
>

Yes, I appreciate that point. I was responding to Nico's comment that
"Generally the client must already have a trust anchor for the
SG to begin with. " And it's not correct that in order to have a VPN
gateway, you need to give it a full TA.

-Ekr